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LEGISLATIVE REFORM
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS:
STATISTICAL STUDY AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Hilary Baldwin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Those who implement the current laws on the termination of parental
rights often presuppose that parents are inferior to other caregivers., The
history of termination laws in this country reflects Congress's attempt to
address child abuse and neglect. However, congressional response has been
mostly political, stemming from horror stories about children living in pov-
erty (especially those who were returned from foster care and re-abused),
motivated by lobbyists, and made in an effort to catch up with state reforms.
In the first section of this paper, I will look at the legislation Congress has
enacted to help children while still preserving families. Looking at federal
termination laws over ten years, one can see a cycle emerge. Agencies and
policies are created, regulations drafted, panels convened, and incentives
given to states in an to attempt to prevent child abuse and its causes. Yet,
the novel approach adopted by one federal act is seen as part of the problem
in the next. Experts in children's rights and children's relationships with
parents give graphic testimony to congressional subcommittees about how
the current policy has the wrong focus, failing to correct the very problem it
seeks to address. More legislation passes calling for a new answer to an old
problem, and the cycle repeats. This highlights the fact that there is no one
answer to the question of child abuse and neglect.
Each child is unique. Therefore, each child deserves an individual-
ized care plan. The temptation when facing a social evil like child abuse is
to pass sweeping federal legislation aimed at combating the "problem."
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However, there is no one cause or one solution for child abuse. The current
federal legislation implements a framework that facilitates termination and
adoption, excluding other possible alternatives.
In the second part of this paper, I will highlight the very real effects
that the current federal law has on mothers who came to the Notre Dame
Legal Aid Clinic for assistance. Each of these mothers could have benefited
from more state services to help them care for their children. Each of them
faced the current federal fifteen-month time limit, which eventually forced
them to give up their parental rights in the hope of receiving post-adoption
visitation with their children.
These mothers are not alone. In the third section of this paper, I will
outline the effects that the changing federal laws have had on terminations in
St. Joseph County, Indiana over the last ten years. The Adoption and Safe
Families Act has resulted in more involuntary terminations, and an increase
in the number of cases with adoption as the stated post-termination plan.
However, the judge rarely, if ever, determines what is best for the child in
these termination hearings, but instead defers to the Guardian Ad Litem
(GAL) or the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA). Although these
advocates are supposed to be objective fact-finders, many of the cases I re-
viewed showed their prejudice.
In the final section, I discuss how the current Adoption and Safe
Families Act favors adoption to the exclusion of other options. Before the
Adoption and Safe Families Act, there was a presumption that family reuni-
fication was in the best interest of the child. The current federal law shifts
that presumption. Now the law presumes that termination is in the child's
best interest if services to reunite the family do not work within fifteen
months. The state is saddled with conflicting roles: seeking termination as a
statutory requirement after fifteen months, as well as investigating and pro-
viding evidence of why termination is not in the child's best interest. This
confuses the traditional adversarial roles. The state must make a motion to
terminate, but is also responsible for opposing that motion.
The state will usually not make this determination without a report
by a Court Appointed Special Advocate ("CASA") for a child or Guardian
Ad Litem. ("GAL"). These CASAs and GALs are supposed to be the eyes
and ears of the state, making the required investigative judgments about the
child's needs. However, GALs and CASAs are minimally trained. They are
not required to have any knowledge of child psychology or social work.
Thus, CASAs and GALs often insert their own biases into their reports, in-
fluencing the prosecutor who files the termination. These advocates also
carry incredible weight with the judge, who often follows their recommenda-
tion even in the rare case when the prosecutor has decided to go against it.
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Another problem with the current federal law is that it requires states
to seek termination but gives them no incentive to provide services to help
families reunite. Instead, Congress rewards states that minimize costly non-
temporary placements and increase the number of children they make avail-
able for adoption. Squeezing every case into the framework of minimal
"reasonable efforts" to assist families does not effectively combat the prob-
lem of child abuse and neglect. We need to give parents meaningful ser-
vices, which will require a financial commitment to these families by the
state. CASAs and GALs must be better trained and follow uniform investi-
gative procedures to ensure that objective information is given to the state.
We need to go back to a truly adversarial system where the prosecutor and
the parent can call witnesses, such as the CASAs and GALs, and confront
them on cross-examination under the rules of evidence. This means doing
away with judicial rubber-stamping of case plans, in favor of informed and
impartial judgments that fit the circumstances of each case individually.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF CHILD ABUSE TREATMENT IN AMERICA
The child welfare policy in America is linked to the history of inden-
tured servitude where poor children were essentially leased to wealthier
families to have a better life.2 However, policies soon equated poverty with
neglect.' In the late nineteenth century, orphanages "rescued" children from
poor homes;4 what appeared to be rescuing was emotionally tearing children
from families struggling to make ends meet. Orphanages were soon viewed
as cruel environments for children that promoted rigid discipline, hardly re-
sembling true family life.'
By the turn of the century, President Theodore Roosevelt hosted a
conference on child welfare whose participants called for the preservation of
the natural family.6 Most states began adopting preliminary social welfare
policies by giving income supplements called Mother's Pensions, to allow
2. See Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 13 (2001).
3. See id. (citing Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423, 426-442
(1983)); see also Jenkins, Child Welfare as a Class System, in CHILDREN AND DECENT PEOPLE 3 (A. Schorr
ed. 1974); Smith, 431 at 834 (indicating that poverty continued to be seen as detrimental to children in the
early 1970s:
Studies also suggest that social workers of middle-class backgrounds, perhaps uncon-
sciously, incline to favor continued placement in foster care with a generally higher-
status family rather than return the child to his natural family, thus reflecting a bias that
treats the natural parents' poverty and lifestyle as prejudicial to the best interests of the
child. (citations omitted)).





single and widowed mothers the freedom to stay at home with their young
children.' In exchange for the money, mothers had to go to church, refrain
from smoking, and otherwise keep a satisfactory home-life.8 Even from this
early period, the government sought to make sure children in poor families
became "assets, not liabilities, to a democratic society." 9
African-American families received this money less often because
there were fewer pension programs for their neighborhoods."0 For children
who could not live at home, "placing-out" to surrogate families was the
common solution." This was followed by a brief movement to "cottage
homes" where a small collection of orphaned children lived together under a
matron, learning how to be good citizens.' 2 Yet, in none of these social poli-
cies was child abuse or neglect addressed in any specific way, partly because
by the New Deal Era, politicians had more sweeping socio-economic poli-
cies to pursue.'3
Child abuse was not recognized as a social issue until the late
1950s. 4 The fear of violence in America, especially among youths, high-
lighted the need for agency intervention even when unsolicited. 5 Politicians
and social workers thought this "aggressive casework" would remedy surg-
ing juvenile delinquency. 6 Vincent DeFrancis, the lawyer at the head of the
Children's Division of the American Human Association, brought national
attention to the issue of child abuse and neglect by calling a conference in
1955 for child welfare professionals. 7 Although he advocated creation of
abuse/neglect departments within existing child welfare agencies, his em-
phasis was on treating neglectful parents, not removing children from their
homes.' 8 In 1957, The United States Children's Bureau followed DeFrancis'
lead by issuing a report recommending that states investigate child abuse and
7. See id. (This phenomenon was somewhat motivated by the increase in poor widows whose husbands
died in World War I.)
8. Id. at 15.
9. See id. (quoting WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 4 (1965)).
10. See id. ADLER, supra note 2, at 15.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 16.
13. See id. (citing LEROY ASHBY, ENDANGERED CHILDREN: DEPENDENCY, NEGLECT AND ABUSE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 101-124 (1997)).
14. See ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY
VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT, ch. 9: The Pediatric Awakening, 164, 165 (1987).
15. See id. at 164 ("The fear of violent crime in the 1950s stimulated the rediscovery of family violence.
Various social commissions in that decade reported that muggings, assaults, and murders committed by youths
were getting out of hand. The caseload of juvenile courts quadrupled in the two decades after 1940. Whether







neglect, and four years later published a listing of available child protective
services.19 Emphasis at this time was on the attentive caseworker as a close
family helper, providing in-house services to families in need. 20  DeFrancis
advised caseworkers to pay close attention to family circumstances, includ-
ing their living conditions and neighborhood, as well as the moral, spiritual
and sexual attributes of the parents. 21 The Children's Bureau expected case-
workers to recruit day care or live-in homemakers to improve these condi-
22tions.
The medical profession also recognized family dynamics as instru-
mental in child abuse cases. A leading pediatrician, Dr. C. Henry Kempe,
collaborated with radiologists and psychiatrists to write the article "The Bat-
tered-Child Syndrome," characterizing child abuse as "a set of symptoms
associated with a disease, namely, inadequate parenting., 23  Doctors who
saw first-hand the trauma inflicted on children in abusive homes parted
company with earlier reports by advocating the temporary removal of chil-
dren from the abusive parent, and a greater involvement by the courts.24
They envisioned a system of temporary foster care while parents were reha-
bilitated.25  Although there were some early statistics indicating that poverty
correlated with abuse, the medical profession insisted in the 1950s that child
abuse could strike anyone. 26 This "classlessness" created sympathy for par-
ents and spurred laws that focused on reporting cases of abuse rather than
punishing parents. 27 This was the first time that child abuse was viewed as a
19. See id. at 166 (citing U.S. Children's Bureau, Child Welfare Services: How They Help Children and
Their Parents (Washington, D.C: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1957)).
20. See id. PLECK, supra note 15, at 165.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 166.
23. Id. at 169, 171 (citing C. Henry Kempe, The Battered Child Syndrome, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOC., v. 181, 17-24 (1962)); see also Frederick E. John, Child Abuse- The Battered Child Syn-
drome, 2 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d, § 1 (2000):
Since 1961 legal scholars, legislators, physicians, sociologists, psychologists and mem-
bers of the mass media have written much about the problem of child abuse. As a result
the terms for and definitions of the problem have varied. For example, child abuse has
been defined as the "intentional, nonaccidental use of physical force, or intentional,
nonaccidental acts of omission, on the part of a parent or other caretaker interacting with
a child in his care, aimed at hurting, injuring, or destroying that child"; also as "any
situation in which a child is physically mistreated by an adult to the point that care or
protection by a source outside the family is needed"; and as "a condition of injury to a
child resulting from the lack or suspension in a nominally responsible adult of the pa-
rental protective function accompanied by a release of unrestrained instinctual energy
toward the child." (citations omitted).
24. See id. PLECK, at 170-7 1.
25. See id. at 170.
26. See id. at 172 (citing MURRAY STRAUS ET. AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY, 31 (1980) (parents earning less than $6,000 a year were twice as likely to report physi-
cally harming or threatening their children, than those who earned over $20,000, in a representative sample)).
27. See id. PLECK at 173.
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problem for which causes could be identified. Before, no one questioned
why children were abused. Shaping the problem was the first step in treating
it. Soon, studies began to discover causes of child abuse.28 Some studies
found men more likely than women to commit abuse, while others found the
opposite." Further studies found that abusive parents could not cope with
the stress of raising children, and parental dynamics lead to abuse.3"
The emerging theory was a "cycle of violence"'" where those who
were themselves mistreated as children began to abuse their children.32 This
again took the emphasis away from parental blame and led to multi-faceted
solutions that addressed the circumstances surrounding the "cycle."33 How-
ever, research studies seeming to support this theory lacked statistical con-
trol groups and large samples.34 The studies failed to prove a link between
an abusive childhood and adult abusers because "abused children grew up in
deprived, multi-problem families, where other factors [than just parental
history of abuse] may have contributed to early learning of aggression."35
Yet, the cycle theory prevailed despite evidence that child abuse did not have
just one cause.36 If children were admitted to the hospital, hospital staff
called child-services within a day, and evaluations on whether or not the
child should return home were made in less than a week. 7 Model treatment
programs included a team of pediatricians, nurses, psychiatrists and case-
workers assigned to families, one of whom was available around the clock.38
Parent's aides might visit the abuser twice a week for almost a year, or the
whole family could live in a treatment center.3 9
These preliminary reporting laws, and the multi-faceted parental re-
habilitation that ensued, quickly were seen as not enough.40 In a background
paper written for the House Select Subcommittee on Education, physician
Keith L. Smith stated that "[d]espite the mandatory reporting laws in most
states . . . many professionals . . . do not report all of the suspected child
abuse incidents which come to their attention."'" The House concluded that
effective programs existed only in some communities and their federal sup-
28. Seeid. at 174.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 173-74.
31. Id. at 174 (noting "cycle of violence" occurs when the abused children grow up to be abusers.).
32. See id.
33. See id. at 173-75.
34. See id. at 175.
35. Id.




40. See id. at 175-76.
41. See H. R. REP. NO. 93-685, (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2763, 2765.
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port was limited.42 In fact, each act that Congress passed to address child
abuse was motivated in part by the idea that current efforts were failing. The
Adoption Assistance and Welfare Act of 1980 stated that the problem with
the current system was that it placed too great an emphasis on foster care.43
This Act addressed the concern that the system did not place enough respon-
sibility on parents." Finally, the current Act attributes the problem to linger-
ing parental or foster care involvement, requiring laws to focus on adoption
because it is seen as a permanent placement for children.45
CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT ACT OF 1973
Congress's original solution, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treat-
ment Act, originated from a conference hosted by the White House that ad-
vocated increased federal funding to combat child abuse and neglect.46 Fol-
lowing that the conference, Congress created a subcommittee focused on
children that heard testimonials, including graphic stories of child abuse.47
Although Congress had earlier considered child abuse legislation, the execu-
tive branch at that time "did not believe there was a need for the legisla-
tion."48 The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1973,49 created in
this subcommittee, was the first federal legislation to address this issue." In
the House Report, Congress acknowledged that although doctors were often
the first to see the repeated pattern of abuse, it was usually after permanent
psychological and physical damage had already occurred." Thus, the Act
defined child abuse broadly, encompassing physical, mental and sexual
abuse to children by any adult responsible for their care.52 The Act created
national centers of personnel trained in "prevention, identification and treat-
ment of child abuse and neglect cases, to provide a broad range of services"
which included satellite centers in smaller communities and provided advice
to other agencies.13 Specific emphasis was placed on "parent self-help" and
"prevention and treatment of drug-related child abuse., 5 4 The Congressional
42. See id.
43. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980).
44. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, 110 Stat.
3063 (1996).
45. See H. R. REP. No. 105-77, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N 2739, 2740.
46. See PLECK, supra note 14, at 176.
47. See id.
48. See H. R. REP. No. 93-685, (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N 2763, 2765.
49. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974).
50. See PLECK, supra note 14, at 176.
51. See H. R. REP. No. 93-685, at 2765 (1973).





Committee wanted to "insure that, among applicants for assistance, parental




States that wanted funding for programs aimed at prevention, identi-
fication of and treatment for abuse were required to have a child abuse and
neglect law, providing immunity to those who reported abuse.56 When abuse
reports were substantiated, states had to provide immediate help to the
abused child and any other children living in the home. 7 This shifted the
emphasis of state laws away from simply reporting to requiring intervention
and treatment. 58 States had to provide information on available treatments to
its citizens and prove that their administrative procedures and trained per-
sonnel effectively combated the problem within the state.59 States demon-
strated financial commitment to these programs by not reducing their fund-
ing and using federal funds to enhance treatment programs.60  The Federal
Government required that records be kept confidential, that police and courts
be involved, and that guardian ad litems be appointed in every case to repre-
sent the child.6 Although these reporting requirements were often disre-
garded, Congress felt that documented intervention was the best solution. 2
The Act also created a National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect
under the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.63 The Center was
required to publish an annual summary on research of child abuse and ne-
glect,6' to keep a list of all programs, private and public, that were successful
in detecting and treating child abuse,65 to provide training materials and
technical assistance to public or non-profit agencies, 66 and to create an advi-
sory board comprised of members of various federal agencies. 6' Thus began
federal review and coordination of state efforts to combat child abuse, which
up to this point had been viewed as lacking "a focus within broader social
service programs., 68 Although the Act was driven by the need to find "an
ultimate solution' 69 to the problem of child abuse, its solution was actually
55. See H. R. REP. No. 93-685, at 2768.
56. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 5, 6 (1974).
57. See id. at6.
58. See H. R. REP. No. 93-685, at 2765.
59. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 6-7 (1974).
60. See id. at 7 (noting the federal funds are channeled directly to the programs, instead of using them to
build facilities to house those programs).
61. Id. The list of requirements for state child abuse prevention and treatment programs are found in Sec.
4(b)(2)(A)-(J). The state had to meet these requirements in order to receive funding.
62. See H. R. REP. No. 93-685, at 2765.
63. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974).
64. See id. at 5.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 7-8.
68. See H. R. REP. No. 93-685,(1973) reprintedin 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2763, 2765.
69. Id. at 2766 (quoting Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Caspar W. Weinberger on Oct. 16,
[Vol. 28:2
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multi-disciplinary.7" The Committee even recognized that these programs
had to remain "informal and nonbureaucratic to be effective.,
71
Congress renewed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
several times72 and imposed further regulations on states, requiring them to
add protective custody laws that met federal guidelines.73 The state welfare
agency could remove a child in danger for three days while the caseworker
filed for custody of the child in juvenile court.74 Although these proceedings
did not require the termination of parental rights, they linked reporting sys-
tems directly to legal sanctions.75  However, reviews during the three-day
period were not standardized, often resulting in a return of the child to the
home because the parents were not thoroughly investigated. 76  Parents un-
derwent home remedies while retaining custody of their child.77 Removal of
a child to the foster care system was seen as necessary only when social ser-
vices could not adequately protect him or her.78
In 1978, Anna Freud, a noted child psychologist, Albert Solnit, a
Yale professor of pediatrics, and Joseph Goldstein, a lawyer, collaborated to
write Beyond the Best Interests of the Child. '9 In this book they stressed a
child's need for stability and for contact with the biological parent.8° In mild
cases, multi-faceted social programs and in-house programs would be
enough. 81 However, in cases of severe abuse, the authors recommended im-
mediate removal, termination of parental rights, and adoption. 82 "They and
other social welfare advocates argued that only by attacking poverty, unem-
ployment, inadequate housing and health care, and the lack of day care
would one solve the problem of child abuse and neglect."83  By the mid
1970s, there was growing recognition that child abuse and neglect had many
causes.84 More reporting increased the number of substantiated cases, over-
1973 that "an ultimate solution" is needed to the child abuse and neglect problem in the United States).
70. See id. at 2767 (attention was called to the need for cooperative efforts of people from many disci-
plines and the Committee Stated its desire "that the demonstration grants and contracts be awarded to a wide
variety of recipients for a variety of programs and projects aimed at preventing, identifying and treating child
abuse.")
71. Id. at 2768.
72. See PLECK, supra note 14, at 177.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 178.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See PLECK, supra note 14, at 178.
79. See id. at 179.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 180.
82. See id. at 179.
83. Id. at 180.
84. See PLECK, supra note 14, at 180 (noting "the issue was more complex than originally thought").
2002]
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whelming child welfare agencies. 85 Although child abuse awareness had
increased dramatically since the 1950s, the state solutions seemed to produce
both negative and positive results.86
There was also a vocal group of foster parents in America upset with
the procedures used to remove children from their care. A large lobby of
foster parents sued the state of New York in the landmark case Smith v. Or-
ganization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
In Smith, the foster parents brought a civil rights class action suit under 42
U.S.C. §1983. The foster families alleged that the foster care removal pro-
cedures violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment because all interested parties had a right to a hearing on
the removal of the foster child.87 The foster parents claimed that after one
year of foster care, the ties between child and foster parent made the foster
home "the true psychological family" of the child.88 Therefore, that family
had "a 'liberty interest' in its survival as a family protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment."89 And, the "child cannot be removed without a prior
hearing satisfying due process."90
New York law had provided appeals for removal decisions after they
were made, but no hearing was held before removal. 9' Although the foster
parents were entitled to ten days prior notice of removal, they had to request
a conference within those ten days if they wished to contest the decision. 92
The expressed policy behind these laws was "the child's need for a normal
family life [which] will usually best be met in the natural home. '93 There-
fore, the law provided that any parent who voluntarily placed their child in
foster care could have that child returned within twenty days notice. 94 Fur-
ther, the parent did not give up legal custody to the child but only charge
over their daily living.95 Only if the child was placed with different foster
parents did the New York City Human Resources Administration allow a
hearing before removal. 96 Any child in foster care over eighteen months
could have his case reviewed by petitioning the New York Family Court.97
85. See id. at 181.
86. See id.
87. Smith, 431 U.S. at 822.





93. Id. at 823.
94. Smith, 431 U.S. at 825.
95. Id. at 828-29.
96. Id. at 831.
97. Id. at 831-32.
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Statistics at the time showed over 80 percent of all children placed in foster
care in New York were placed there by their parents.98
The Supreme Court held that these hearings were adequate because
foster families did merit the same level of Due Process protection as natural
families.99 The Court wrote that "there does exist a 'private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter ... that has been afforded both substantive
and procedural protection. But is the relation of foster parent to foster child
sufficiently akin to the concept of 'family' recognized in our precedents to
merit similar protection?"' 00 To answer the question, the Court noted that
the usual family implied biological ties. l0 ' However, the Court stated that
the most prized relationship in society was marriage, for which there were no
biological ties. 0 2 "Thus the importance of the familial relationship, to the
individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attach-
ments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it
plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of children,...
as well as from the fact of blood relationship."'0' However, the Court noted
that unlike the natural family, the foster family has its origin in contract law
and is, by definition, a creature of the state." "Whatever emotional ties may
develop between foster parent and foster child have their origins in an ar-
rangement in which the State has been a partner from the outset."'0° There-
fore, the Supreme Court concluded that the contractual nature of the foster
family and its limited recognition by New York made any constitutionally
protected liberty interest limited.0 6 Therefore, while the Court did not com-
pletely rule out a constitutionally protected right of a foster parent in her
family, it said that the New York statutory scheme was adequate.
0 7
The Smith case also produced significant dicta about the state of the
foster care system. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the New York
government believed its system functioned according to the timetables set
out in the statute and that foster care was only a temporary placement. 8
Yet, the Court found that the median time spent in foster care was four
98. There is no differentiation here between parents who consented to placing their children in foster care
voluntarily and those influenced by the state's ultimatum of putting their child in the system or facing an
involuntary termination proceeding.
99. Smith, 431 U.S. at 847.
100. Id. at 842 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 843.
102. Id. at 844.
103. Id. (citation omitted).
104. Id. at 845.
105. Smith, 431 U.S. at 845.
106. Id. at 846.
107. Id. at 848.
108. Id. at 833.
20021
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years.'0 9 The Court recognized that "from the standpoint of natural parents,
such as the appellant intervenors here, foster care has been condemned as a
class-based intrusion in the family life of the poor." ''1 To support this con-
tention, the Court found that over fifty percent of the children in New York
foster care were from female-headed households receiving governmental aid,
and at least seventy-seven percent of the children were minorities."' The
Court also found that not all allegedly voluntary placements were in fact
voluntary." 2 Social workers of middle class backgrounds were inclined to
favor higher-status foster families, "thus reflecting a bias that treats the natu-
ral parents' poverty and lifestyle as prejudicial to the best interests of the
child."".3 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court also acknowledged that social
work caseloads were very high, and that finding suitable foster families was
often difficult." 4 Although any removal of a child from any home was trau-
matic, the Supreme Court still recognized that "too warm a relation between
foster parent and foster child is not the only possible problem in foster
care.""' 5 The need to keep the relationships short resulted in an average of
three foster placements for each child." 6 Yet, "even when it is clear that a
foster child will not be returned to his natural parents, it is rare that he
achieves a stable home life through final termination of parental ties and
adoption into a new permanent family.""' 7 The Court summed up the current
problem: "the State, the natural parents, and the foster parents, all of whom
share some portion of the responsibility for the guardianship of the child...
are parties, and all contend that the position they advocate is most in accord
with the rights and interests of the children."".8
This summary highlights the very problem with any legal system sur-
rounding children's rights: no one solution is always best. However, faced
with having to make a decision in the case, the Supreme Court ultimately
held that the rights of the natural parents are absolute.' Therefore, no hear-
ing is constitutionally required to remove a child from foster care in order to
return him to his natural family. Although the foster family may in many
respects, including psychological aspects, resemble a family, it does not have
a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in preservation, and therefore no
109. Id. at 836.
110. Id. at 833.
111. Smith, 431 U.S. at 833-34.
112. Id. at 834.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 836.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 837.
117. Smith, 431 U.S. at 837.
118. Id. at 842.
119. Id. at 846.
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standing to request a hearing before removal occurs.1 20 Not surprisingly, the
underlying question of what would be in the child's best interest was left
unresolved. The Supreme Court acknowledged that foster care had both pros
and cons because it allowed a safe temporary home for children yet also
made it hard for children to readjust to new placements because of the psy-
chological bond formed between children and their foster parents.
ADOPTION ASSISTANCE AND CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1980
The dicta in the Smith case highlighted the growing concern that
children were spending far too long in foster care, an average of four years
in New York.121 "Choices had to be made between treatment or punishment,
too much intervention or not enough, and between ensuring parental liberties
or protecting children." '122 In 1980, Congress enacted the Adoption Assis-
tance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.123 It changed child welfare policies by
attempting to move children out of foster care and return them home or to
place them up for adoption. 24 Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act provided money to
families where one parent was absent. 25  The Federal Government also
matched state funds to children in foster care who received AFDC at home,
thereby making money paid to the foster care families exceed that paid to
similarly situated poor families.1 26 Despite this funding, Congress noted that
the quality of foster care was inadequate and child welfare programs under
Title IV-B of the Social Security Act were over ninety percent funded by the
states.127 Of the total money spent, seventy-three percent went to foster care
while three percent went to subsidizing adoptions.12 Nonetheless, Congress
wrote about foster conditions similar to those found by the Supreme Court in
the Smith case. Most of the states investigated by Congress had significant
problems managing their foster care programs. 129 Congress found numerous
indications that the foster care system was detrimental to children. 3 ° The
120. Id. at 847.
121. See id. at 836.
122. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 847.
123. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980).
124. See S. REP. No. 96-336, (1997) reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448, 1450.
125. See id. at 1459.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 1460.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 1458.
130. See S. REP. No. 96-336, (1997) reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448, 1459.
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national average foster care placement was two and a half years.' The fed-
eral government was not closely monitoring state programs, which were au-
thorized to receive over 220 million dollars from the national budget, but
never got more than fifty-six million. 3 2
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 was there-
fore designed to "de-emphasize the use of foster care and encourage greater
efforts to place children in permanent homes."'33 The Act forced states to
provide a detailed plan for reducing the number of children in foster care
over two years.'34 Congress did not want to sink funds into a foster care sys-
tem where the average placement was greater than two years because the
system was not seen as a permanent solution.' Congress most likely also
believed that in order to really improve the foster care system and monitor
state programs, the full projected amount of over $220 million a year would
have to be spent. This belief is reflected in the Act's fiscal distribution that
capped federal funds for state foster care, and created an adoption assistance
program that was "open ended."' 36 Further, the Act provided over $250 mil-
lion for strengthening child welfare services designed to prevent the separa-
tion of children from their families, restoring them to their families, or plac-
ing them for adoption.'37
The Act emphasized avoiding foster care or limiting a child's time in
the program. In order to receive extra federal funds to assist with adoptions
and foster care, states had to create a child placement plan that met numer-
ous requirements. 138 First, it stated that for each child, "reasonable efforts"
should be made to avoid a child's removal from her home or return the child
home. 139 Second, the state had to develop a case plan for each child, 40 de-
tailing how the child would be cared for and what steps would be taken to
return the child home or place the child up for adoption.' 4' The case plan
required services be provided to the parents, foster parents, and child with
131. See id.
132. See id. at 1449.
133. See id. at 1461.
134. See id. ("States would be required to establish goals as to the maximum number of children who will
remain in foster care for in excess of 24 months."); see also Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500, 502 (1980).
135. See S. REP. No. 96-336, at 1460.
136. Id. at 1461.
137. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500, 519
(1980).
138. Seeid. at 503.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. at511.
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the goal of permanency. 142 This case plan would be reviewed to make sure
the child was put in the "least restrictive (most family like) setting available
and in close proximity to the parents' home, consistent with the best interest
and special needs of the child."'4 3 The review had to occur at least every six
months to determine how well the case plan was followed and if the current
placement was still necessary and appropriate.144 Further, the review had to
assess the amount of progress made in alleviating the problems that initially
required foster care, and to estimate a date when the child could return home
or be placed up for adoption. 145 These periodic reviews were supplemented
by a dispositional hearing, occurring no later than eighteen months after
placement and periodically thereafter, to determine the "future status of the
child.' 46 Although the "future status" could include returning to the parents,
continuing foster care temporarily or more permanently, or adoption, the
child's future was not limited to those options. 47 These dispositional hear-
ings were considered procedural safeguards that attempted to insure the par-
ent's rights would be considered, including any change in visitation.
4 8
However, the Act did not guarantee that children were protected. In
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, a guardian
ad litem sued the local government for failing to protect Joshua DeShaney
from child abuse. 49 Joshua lived with his divorced father Randy. 50 Randy's
second wife complained to authorities that Randy beat Joshua. 5' Winnebago
County Department of Social Services ("Social Services") did not pursue the
allegations after Randy denied them.152 A year later Joshua was admitted to
the hospital with multiple bruises, the doctor suspected abuse and again So-
cial Services was called.' Although Social Services gathered a team of
doctors, detectives and a lawyer, they decided there was insufficient evi-
dence to place Joshua with the custody of the court.154 The team did recom-
mend preschool for Joshua and counseling services for Randy, which he
142. See id.






148. See id. ("Procedural safeguards shall also be applied with respect to parental rights pertaining to the
removal of the child from the home of his parents, to a change in the child's placement, and to any determina-
tion affecting visitation privileges of parents.")
149. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
150. Id.






agreed to voluntarily.'55 Nevertheless, Joshua's condition worsened because
Randy continued to beat him.'56 A caseworker visited the home monthly and
suspected child abuse, but she did nothing more than record her findings in a
file.'57 Eventually, Randy's beatings sent Joshua into a coma and emergency
brain surgery revealed hemorrhages from traumatic head injuries over a pe-
riod of years. 5 8 Joshua will spend the rest of his life in a home for the se-
verely retarded.'59 Despite these horrific facts, and Social Services' negli-
gence, the Supreme Court found that Joshua had no right to be protected by
the state. 60 The Due Process Clause was a limit on state power, said the
Supreme Court, not a "guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and se-
curity.' 6 ' This means that Joshua had "no affirmative right to governmental
aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life.' 162
Although the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act required
periodic reviews of a child's situation to facilitate a permanent solution to
his problem, the Act did not guarantee that helpful aid would be given. Al-
though the main purpose of the Act was to keep families together by facili-
tating in-house monitoring like that performed by the social worker in De-
Shaney, the Act recognized that in some situations, foster care, even long-
term, was the best option for the child. However, there was a clear aware-
ness of the fiscal costs of keeping children in temporary placements. These
rising fiscal costs helped motivate Congress to create adoption incentives.
Therefore the Act focused on parent's rights, like those illustrated in the
Smith case, and funded solutions to prevent removal of the child in the first
place. After seeing the detrimental affect of foster care on children illus-
trated by Smith, the Act sought to preserve nuclear families or at least to
decrease the time in state placement by creating adoption incentives. Al-
though DeShaney was seen as a tragedy, 163 intervention beyond the case plan
and periodic family visits was never a goal of the Act. Increased interven-
tion was seen as costly and against the common presumption, despite De-
Shaney, that the best place for a child was in his nuclear family.
155. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192.




160. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 196.
163. Id. at 191.
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WELFARE REFORM ACT OF 1996
In the fifteen years that followed the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act, the country became increasingly frustrated with the economic
and social costs of the Welfare and Medicaid systems and deemed them fail-
ures."6 This prompted Congress to enact the Welfare Reform Act, or Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.165
The majority of the Act concerned itself with the dismantling of the federally
funded Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program and
creating a block grant program giving Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families. 166 It was an instrumental part of a program to reform the Federal
Budget. 167 Title V of the Act addressed child protection. 168 It provided for a
national random sample study of children at risk for child abuse or neglect. 69
The study was to follow abused children for several years, report on the cir-
cumstances that lead to their removal from the home, and the nature and du-
ration of subsequent placements. 7 ° Secondly, the Act endorsed state statu-
tory preferences for placements with an adult relative of the child who meets
caregiver standards, over non-related caregivers. 7 '
CURRENT LAW: ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT OF 1997
The major overhaul in child placement outside of the home, how-
ever, occurred with the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997.172 Al-
though the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980173 favored
permanent placements and created incentives for adoption, the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997 mandated that if reasonable efforts to keep a fam-
ily together failed, a permanent home for the child should be found quickly,
probably through adoption. 174  Allowing Social Services to get out of the
"reasonable efforts" requirement left room for dire situations like that of
Joshua DeShaney. The 1997 Act de-emphasized foster care because it was
both temporary and costly. The House Subcommittee on Human Resources
164. See H. R. REP. No. 104-65, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2184 ("There is little doubt that the
current welfare system is a failure .... Most devastating of all, it fails the Nation's children").
165. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105, 2105 (1996).
166. Seeid. at2113.
167. SeeH. R. REP. NO. 104-65 at 2191.
168. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105, 2277 (1996).
169. See id.
170. See id. at 2278.
171. Id.
172. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
173. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980).
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reported that the foster care caseload was almost a half a million, and chil-
dren could expect to stay in foster care for almost three years.'75 Recall that
this is an increase from the two-year average found by the Senate Finance
Committee in 1980.176 The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980 merely increased adoption incentives in response to the foster care
problem, while still funding solutions that prevented child removal and pro-
tected parents' rights. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, how-
ever, committed the nation to adoption as the best solution to the problem of
abused children who must be removed from their home. The push for adop-
tion came largely from adoption lobbyists who sought to free more children
for adoption. The House Ways and Means Committee held hearings on the
Act, inviting testimony from adoptive parents and the heads of private adop-
tion organizations, like The National Child Welfare League.'77 These lobby-
ists pushed for the elimination or diminishment of the "'reasonable efforts'
provision [because it] may result in children being left with or returned to
abusive families, and may be a barrier to permanent placement and adoption
of children."' 78
The House Report recognized "that adoption is an effective way to
assure that children grow up in loving families and that they become happy
and productive citizens as adults."'79 This language acknowledges that adop-
tion is simply one solution for abused children. There is no evidence in the
legislative history that adoption is always preferable over other alternatives.
In fact, for children of color and older children, adoption is usually unrealis-
tic. However, the Act provides these children with little assistance, taking
away money from other alternatives that could be of use to them, like foster
care.
The Adoption and Safe Families Act also sought to clarify the
vagueness of the "reasonable efforts" standard as written in the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.18° The House Report criticized
the previous "reasonable efforts" standard as a barrier to expedited adop-
tion. '8 Although, the Report noted that the "reasonable efforts" standard
helped to prevent permanent removal by providing services to families, it
174. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2115 (1997).
175. See H. R. REP. No. 105-77, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.A.A.N 2739, 2740.
176. See S. REP. No. 96-336, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.A.A.N 1448, 1461.
177. See Hearings on Adoption and Safe Families Act, 105th Cong. Serial No. 104-76, before the House
Ways and Means Comm., June 27, 1996.
178. Id.
179. See H. R. REP. No. 105-77, at 2740.
180. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980).
181. See H. R. REP. NO. 105-77, at 2740.
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hindered adoption because it favored parental rights.'82 Yet, the House re-
port recognized that it was not the federal statute alone, but the social worker
and court interpretation of "reasonable efforts" that led to "long spells of
foster care.' ' 183 Further, the Report acknowledged that a large barrier to per-
manent placements was overworked caseworkers that believed that children
already in foster care were safe, and thus gave them and their families "less
attention than they deserve."' 84
Despite the indications that the "reasonable efforts" standard was not
the true heart of the problem, Congress decided to amend the criteria to
speed up adoptions. 85 Instead of authorizing a study or convening a panel to
investigate why "reasonable efforts" to reunite a family took so long, and if
those efforts were necessary, Congress assumed those efforts were not worth
the trouble. Although Congress claimed to recognize "the importance and
essential fairness of the reasonable efforts criterion," it made specific men-
tion of the "well over" four and a half billion dollars spent to help families
combat the causes of child abuse, as if to highlight its exacerbation. 86 Con-
gress called for a "measured response" to aid states in terminating parental
rights in more cases, more quickly. 87  Congress devalued the "reasonable
efforts" used to help families stay together because they often resulted in
children staying longer in temporary placement. This temporary status
meant that government had to pay for programs to rehabilitate their families
while also paying for the foster care. Therefore, Congress pushed for what
they felt was a more cost-effective solution: adoption. 88
Although the first section of the Act is titled "Clarification of the
Reasonable Efforts Requirement," it only addressed when those "efforts"
should be used, not what they entail.'89 Although the Act stated that "the
child's health and safety shall be the paramount concern," it did not place
182. See id.
One barrier is the "reasonable efforts' criterion in the federal statute. This criterion re-
quires States to make reasonable efforts to prevent removing a child from its home and
to facilitate returning children to their homes if removal has been necessary. The intent
of this policy is to provide services to families so that they can continue to fulfill their
child rearing function. However, there seems to be a growing belief that federal statues,
the social work profession, and the courts sometimes err on the side of protecting the
rights of the parents. As a result, too many children are subjected to long spells of fos-
ter care ....
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2741.
185. See id. at 2740.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2129 (1997) (al-
though the Act mandates a study on kinship care, no study on the causes of child abuse is undertaken, in con-
trast to the other acts).
189. See id. at 2116.
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any emphasis on other criteria, such as preserving the psychological bond
between the parent and child.'90 The goal was to move children to permanent
safe environments as soon as possible. With that as the goal, Congress as-
sumed that adoption was usually the preferable solution. Congress at-
tempted to speed up the adoption process by reducing the amount of time
social workers have to use "reasonable efforts" to reunite a family. Congress
placed no value on alternative placements, and left little time to find them.
In fact, the Act mandates that state child protection services be evaluated
based on the number of children in foster care, the length of those place-
ments, and the number of adoptions.' 9 ' The Secretary of Health and Human
Services uses these evaluations to rate states annually, giving financial in-
centives to the ones with the best scores.' 92 What suffers is individualized
attention for each child, and therefore the quality of the placements given the
child's particular circumstances.
In changing the "reasonable efforts" standard to increase the speed of
adoptions, Congress effectively eliminated time to seek other alternatives.
Most notably, states only have to provide family reunification services for
the first fifteen months after the child enters foster care.'93 Congress has thus
determined that "efforts" to reunite the family are only "reasonable" within
those first few months because the state has no obligation to family unity
beyond that point. "Reasonable efforts" at reunification can stop even ear-
lier if they are considered inconsistent with the child's "permanency" plan.194
Previously, a permanency plan and a dispositional hearing created by the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act occurred within eighteen
months of a child's entering foster care.19' In these hearings, all possible
options were discussed for the child including returning to the parents, or
staying in foster care for longer periods.'96 These dispositional hearings
were considered procedural safeguards that insured the parent's rights would
be considered, including any change in visitation. 197 Now the "permanency"
hearing and must occur within one year.198 The hearing no longer considers
190. Id.
191. See id. at 2126.
192. See id.
193. Seeid. at2131.
194. See id. at2116.
195. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500, 511
(1980).
196. See id.
197. Id. ("[P]rocedural safeguards shall also be applied with respect to parental rights pertaining to the
removal of the child from the home of his parents, to a change in the child's placement, and to any determina-
tion affecting visitation privileges of parents.")
198. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2740 (1997). Could
not locate this page
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the "future status" of the child but forces the courts to determine whether the
child will be returned to the parent. 99 If the child is not returned to the par-
ent there must be a "planned permanent living arrangement" for the child.200
Congress "intentionally deleted non-relative long-term foster care from this
list to emphasize that such an arrangement should be rarely used and should
not be considered a permanent placement.
20
'
Foster parent lobbyists, including the director of Family Preservation
Services, reminded Congress that children in temporary care usually develop
ties to those homes. With that in mind, foster parents and any pre-adoptive
parents or relatives are now required to have notice of these permanency
hearings202 and an opportunity to state why they would be the best caregiver
for the child °.2 3 This broadens the scope of the hearing by allowing all inter-
ested parties to show what they could offer the child. This effectively over-
rules Smith, because it gives non-traditional families an opportunity to be
heard. Although these interested parties may not have legal standing, judges
are giving them a voice in court. However, parents who are struggling to
find their feet are directly compared to foster parents and pre-adoptive par-
ents as if to highlight the ways in which they do not measure up. The rela-
tionship between the child and his biological parents is no longer the focus
of the hearing, destroying the rebuttable presumption that children benefit by
being with their real parents. The "procedural safeguards" of the disposi-
tional hearing insuring careful consideration of parents' rights to visitation
are eliminated. The focus is taken off the "future status" of the child and
placed on the question of which person can offer a "permanent" solution. If
parents can not demonstrate that they are ready to take their child back per-
manently, they are not part of the "permanency plan" for their child. Within
one year, the "reasonable efforts" to reunite a child with a family can cease,
forcing the state to find a quick, permanent placement.
States are required to initiate the termination of parental rights if the
child has been in foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months.20 4
This is true even when the child is not returned home sooner because the
state delayed in providing services required in the case plan. Congress pre-
sumes that after fifteen consecutive months in foster care it is always in the
best interest of the child to consider terminating parental rights! This is
manifestly unfair when the state delays providing the requisite services.
199. See id. at 2128.
200. See id. at 2128-29.
201. H. R. REP. No. 105-77, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2746.
202. 111 Stat. at 2128.
203. 111 Stat. at 2128.
204. See id. at 2118. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2000)).
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Instead of fifteen months of "reasonable efforts," there are often many
months of no efforts to help a family. "Reasonable efforts" should require
that actual efforts be made. "Reasonable efforts" should not be reduced to a
mere time limit allowing states to get out of providing services simply be-
cause fifteen months have passed. The Adoption and Safe Families Act is
designed to force states to quickly seek a hearing on termination, to facilitate
permanent adoptions, rather than waste time and money on temporary solu-
tions!
Although states can just wait fifteen months and file for termination,
they can also take an active role in speeding up termination. They can do
this by categorizing some of their cases as statutory "aggravated" circum-
stances. States can by-pass family reunification altogether if the parent
committed, or aided in the commission of murder or manslaughter of another
one of their children, or had their parental rights to another child terminated,
or other "aggravated" circumstances." 5 States are free to decide what they
consider "aggravated," but Congress indicates abandonment, torture, and
chronic or sexual abuse as possibilities. 0 6 The legislative history on this
section indicates that it is Congress' intent to deprive these children immedi-
ately deprive these children of contact with their parents: "States are allowed
to by-pass the Federal reasonable efforts criteria and instead would be re-
quired to make efforts to place the child for adoption., 207 Congress endorses
only two real options for children: staying with parents or being adopted.
Reasonable efforts, seen as a "barrier" to adoption, are gladly removed if the
parents are prejudged unfit by falling into one of these categories. Perhaps
this is justified when parents have actually murdered a child, but what about
battered women who courts might judge "failed to protect" their child
against the abuse they could not escape themselves? 28  In addition, what
about those who had the rights to a previous child terminated? This suggests
that no matter what changes the parent makes in her life, if she lost a child
before, she is unfit. What is the point of "reasonable efforts" if one is not
allowed to make them?
Judicial discretion has to come in to play to soften these statutory re-
quirements. Imagine a mother who was in an abusive relationship at eight-
een. She does not have a high school education or enough job skills to work
outside of the home. Her boyfriend abuses her, and her child. Worst of all
205. See id. at 2116. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (2000)).
206. See id.
207. H. R. REP. No. 96-336, 105-77, at 8 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, at 2740 (emphasis
added).
208. See In re B.R., 6699 N.E.2d 347 (Il. App. Ct. 1996); In re Julie E., 451 N.W.2d 576 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990); In re LE_E_, G_J_J, 839 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
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he is controlling and does not let allow her to leave the house, or even to
work. Although this may sound extreme, battered women face situations
like this frequently. If child protective services get involved, they could de-
cide this mother has failed to protect her child from the abuse by her boy-
friend. In so doing, she is now in an "aggravated" circumstance according to
the Act and termination can occur without "reasonable efforts." Sadly, it is
in situations like this, where state services could be most beneficial. Without
outside help, a battered woman may not have the financial means to leave
her abuser. There is nothing in the legislative history that accounts for these
situations. In fact, one could think up countless other situations in which a
parent falls into an "aggravated circumstance" category but still deserves
"reasonable efforts" at reunification with their child. This merely re-
emphasizes that "reasonable efforts" should not be a formality. Each case,
like each child, is unique. Judicial discretion must be present to differentiate
between the battered woman and someone who purposefully harms her child.
Further, the state is not limited to murders, aggravated circum-
stances, or previous terminations, but is free to use its "discretion" to deter-
mine when efforts to reunite the family should not be made at all.209 This
undercuts the entire statutory scheme crafted in Section 101(a) of the Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act. "Reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve
and reunify families" but the state has full discretion to decide that parents
are unfit to deserve these services. Not only do states have discretion to by-
pass "reasonable efforts" at reunification, "Committee Members [writing the
House Report on this Act] recognize that in certain extreme cases, no efforts
to reunite the family are reasonable. ' 210
Arguably, the Act provides an alternative for states if termination is
not in the best interest of the child, or if a relative is currently caring for the
child.21' But, to exercise this option, however, the state must provide a com-
pelling interest as to why termination is not presumptively in the child's best
interest.212 Yet, the state is simultaneously required by the Act to seek ter-
mination. Before the Adoption and Safe Families Act, the law presumed that
termination was not in the child's best interest, forcing the state to list the
reasons why it believed otherwise. Now, the Act makes the opposite pre-
sumption. The state has must move for the requisite termination hearing and
then provide evidence as to why it believes termination is not in the child's
best interest, if they feel that this is the case. A caseworker that who wants
209. 111 Stat. at 2116. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (2000)).
210. See H. R. REP. NO. 105-77 at 11 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.CA.N. 2739, 2743.
211. See 111 Stat. 2118. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i) (2000)).
212. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(ii)). See id. at 2116.
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to dismiss the required termination petition must do additional work. If the
social worker thinks that the parent and child should stay together, he or she
must explain why the state should go against its statutory duty to try to ter-
minate the parent's rights. Absent the state's efforts to show a compelling
interest in keeping the family together, the general rule that requires states to
terminate parental rights can prevail. This general rule has nothing to do
with permanency, or even adoption. States terminate parental rights regard-
less of whether there is an actual adoptive home available for that child.
Congress presumes that by terminating parental rights, children will
be more attractive for adoption. Instead of looking for the best possible
placement for a child by evaluating multiple options, Congress pushes adop-
tion. "Reasonable efforts" for family reunification are sustained only to the
extent that parents are worthy of them,213 and they do not take too long.214
Congress wanted to emphasize "the State's responsibility for taking specific
actions to find and finalize adoptive families., 215  Adoption is encouraged
with the addition of the by-pass on "reasonable efforts" to reunite families,
and with financial incentives. 26  The Federal government gives $4,000 for
each foster care adoption ($2,000 for any special needs adoption) which ex-
ceeds a base amount.21 7 States are also required to document the steps taken
to find an adoptive family or other permanent placement for the child.2"8 The
federal government will not give money to states that "denied or delayed the
placement of a child for adoption when an approved family is available out-
side of the jurisdiction." 219
Increasing the state's adoption rate for foster care children is the
clear goal of the Adoption and Safe Families Act.22° Congress wanted to be
sure that even "while family reunification might be the preferred goal for a
particular child, caseworkers could also begin adoption planning, so that if
family reunification is unsuccessful then termination of parental rights can
be started immediately., 221 But when the "reasonable efforts" standard is
diluted and adoption incentives are created, caseworkers have less encour-
agement to find the best solution for each child. Congress noted that
"[w]hile adoption was the permanency goal for fifteen percent of foster chil-
213. See 111 Stat. at2117.
214. See id. at2130.
215. H. R REP. No. 105-77 at 14 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.CA.N. 2739, 2747.
216. 111 Stat. at 2122. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 673(b) (2000)).
217. See id.
218. See id. at 2121. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(1)(E) (2000)).
219. Id. at 2125 (emphasis added) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 674(e)(1) (1997), repealed by Child Support
Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-200, § 301(c), 112 Stat. 645, 658).
220. See H. R. REP. No. 105-77, at 7 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739 ("the bill (H.R. 867) to
promote the adoption of children in foster care").
221. Id. at 2743.
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dren in 1990, only eight percent of the children who left care in that year
were adopted., 222 How is making adoption the goal for more children going
to "produce. a substantial increase in adoptions in the years ahead" 223 if less
than the desired adoptions are occurring currently? Congress admitted, "it is
not clear that earlier reviews [i.e. permanency hearings occurring at twelve
instead of eighteen months] have expedited the adoption process., 224 What
then is the point of encouraging faster adoption proceedings when they will
not necessarily lead to more adoptions? Perhaps the answer is found in the
Congressional Budget Office's estimation that the Act will "produce budget-
ary savings by moving children from foster care to less expensive adoption
placements., 225 The Adoption and Safe Families Act's promotion of adop-
tion is motivated in large part by budgetary savings, which help craft the
policy of quicker terminations and less options for children.
CLINICAL EXPERIENCE
In order to understand how the Adoption and Safe Families Act has
played out in actual cases, I want to share the stories of two clients from the
Notre Dame Legal Aid Clinic. In practice, the two main problems with the
current Act are 1) the lack of services for struggling parents and 2) the re-
quired termination at fifteen months. With these formidable obstacles, law-
yer and client come face to face with their lack of choices. And sadly, once
a termination case has been opened, it is sometimes best to advise your client
to consent to the termination and ask for post-adoption contact.
One of my clients at the Notre Dame Legal Aid clinic is a woman I
will call Iris.226 Iris's daughter, Mary Jane, was sexually molested by her
father.227 The prosecutor pressed charges against the father, convicted and
jailed him. Iris divorced this man and later re-married. However, Mary Jane
needed counseling to recover from the abuse. Mary Jane's therapist recom-
mended that she stay as an inpatient at the local mental health facility. Ini-
tially Medicaid paid for this inpatient care. But eventually, Iris ran out of
Medicaid assistance and could not afford to pay for Mary Jane's stay at the
hospital. Therefore, Iris gave the care of Mary Jane over to the state so that
it could shoulder the fiscal responsibility for the inpatient bills. This was the
only way Iris could continue to give Mary Jane the kind of psychological
222. Id. at 2744.
223. Id. at 2740.
224. Id. at 2757.
225. Id. at 2753.
226. Although Iris has consented to my telling her story in this paper, I am giving her a fictitious name to
keep our confidentiality.
227. Mary Jane is a fictitious name.
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care she needed. Thus, the Indiana Department of Children and Family Ser-
vices ("DCFS") through its Child Protective Services ("CPS") division de-
clared Mary Jane a Child in Need of Services, or CHINS. The court shifted
custody of Mary Jane to the state and she remained an inpatient. Further, the
court appointed a Guardian Ad Litem for Mary Jane. CPS made a case plan
for Mary Jane outlining goals for all involved, including Iris and the GAL.
This plan originally stated that Mary Jane should return home after her hos-
pitalization.
Mary Jane remained hospitalized during her initial treatment but as
she appeared to improve, counselors allowed her to return home to visit her
mother and siblings. Mary Jane's Guardian Ad Litem agreed that this was
appropriate. She understood that Mary Jane was in state custody in order to
get the care she needed, but the case plan indicated she should eventually
return home to live with her family. However, during one of these home
visits, Mary Jane molested one of her siblings. CPS then modified the case
plan, and required that Iris give Mary Jane a separate room away from the
other children when she eventually returned home. This required Iris to try
to move to a bigger house, which she was financially unable to do. Iris be-
gan to understand that she might never be fully compliant with her case plan
because she was too poor to comply. Although the state was paying Mary
Jane's care expenses first at the hospital and then at a foster home, there was
no state money available to Iris to secure a separate room for Mary Jane. At
this point, state financial aid to assist Iris in complying with her case plan
might have resolved the situation. In the meantime, Mary Jane returned to
the hospital.
Once this care was over, however, the state did not return Mary Jane
to Iris. Instead, the state sent Mary Jane to a therapeutic foster home outside
of the county. Iris was allowed to visit Mary Jane once a week at the central
offices of the agency that coordinated the therapeutic foster care. A liaison
from the foster home agency would bring Mary Jane to the office and Iris
could visit her there. However, Iris's weekly visits were scheduled back-to-
back with Mary Jane's counseling sessions. Since Mary Jane was now out
of the county, it took longer for her to get to her therapist. This reduced the
amount of time Iris could see Mary Jane. We asked the CPS caseworker to
create a different schedule, which would allow Mary Jane to see her therapist
and her mother on separate days. Instead, CPS decided to "solve" this prob-
lem by switching Mary Jane to a therapist in her own county. This new
therapist was not familiar with Mary Jane's case. It was certainly not neces-
sary for Mary Jane to change therapists in the middle of treatment. Further-
more, the first therapist had understood Mary Jane's need to return home to
her mother, Iris, as soon as she was able.
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The situation was further complicated when an argument occurred
between Iris and the therapeutic foster home liaison. In front of Mary Jane,
the liaison asked Iris if CPS intended to terminate her parental rights. This
made Iris upset and the two argued briefly. However, the liaison relayed this
conversation to the CPS caseworker who then became upset at Iris for dis-
cussing termination in front of Mary Jane. The CPS caseworker relayed this
information to the GAL who then wanted to stop Iris from seeing Mary Jane
at all.
Iris was not without blame, however. She often acted childish. Iris
had been the baby in her own family, and was used to getting her way by
throwing temper tantrums. Another member of her family had come for-
ward, offering to house Mary Jane. Iris wanted Mary Jane to live with her.
She was so upset at the relative who seemed to be taking Mary Jane away
from her. Therefore, Iris threw a temper tantrum of sorts, yelling at family
members and threatening them. No one in her own family actually believed
her, but this behavior did not go over well with CPS or the GAL.
All of this came to a head when Mary Jane's placement was re-
viewed at her six-month CHINS hearing. At that hearing, the GAL stated
she felt that Iris should no longer be able to visit Mary Jane. She supported
her opinion with a psychological evaluation of Iris that recommended termi-
nation despite the fact that her psychological profile was normal. Everyone
else at the hearing, including the prosecutor, who represents CPS, and Mary
Jane's therapist recommended Iris be allowed to visit her daughter. How-
ever, the judge at the hearing was sitting pro-tem, and stated he was not fa-
miliar with the case. Therefore, he felt obliged to go along with the GAL.
We were shocked that a mother who had done so much for her child's well
being was no longer able to visit with her. After the hearing, however, we
talked to the therapist who said that the psychological evaluation had origi-
nally recommended visitation. However, the Office of Family and Children
called the psychologist responsible for the report and told him he had to rec-
ommend termination. The therapist changed his recommendation.
Mary Jane was later moved from therapeutic foster care to placement
with relatives. However, Iris was upset that her relatives could see Mary
Jane and she could not. She threw temper-tantrums and yelled at her family.
Furthermore, Iris and her relatives differed on how to raise Mary Jane and as
Iris later put it: "She did not give birth to her! She was not in labor with
[Mary Jane], I was!"
Iris screamed those words during an office visit at the clinic. She
was there to sign a voluntary consent to the termination of her parental
rights. Despite Iris' substantial compliance with the case plan, Mary Jane
stayed with her relatives for more than fifteen months, so the state began
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termination proceedings. Although the prosecutor initially favored a simple
guardianship by the relatives over Mary Jane, the Office of Family and Chil-
dren and the GAL were in favor of termination. The prosecutor complied
and pursued termination. Iris' anger at the situation swayed the CPS case-
worker that Mary Jane would be best served away from her mother. Iris was
enraged. Yet, as lawyers we had to honestly counsel our client on her
chances of winning, which we felt were slim. Now GAL, the CPS case-
worker, and the prosecutor felt termination was appropriate. We were con-
vinced that that judge would rule as he did in the six-month hearing and side
with GAL. Although we could oppose the termination in court, we felt vol-
untary termination was the best option because it allowed Mary Jane to be
adopted by her relatives, who would most likely agree to post-adoption visi-
tation.
Iris consented to the termination of her rights only after a lot of an-
ger. Iris' new husband was there and helped us persuade her that the only
way she would get to see Mary Jane, was to sign away her rights. If we op-
posed the termination, we told her, and the state prevailed, Mary Jane would
be given up for adoption - and not necessarily to relatives. Although we
could appeal the probate court's decision, we did not want to take this risk.
Therefore, Iris consented to the adoption of Mary Jane.
Iris' consent was conditioned on adoption by the same relatives who
had cared for Mary Jane, and on the agreement between the parties for post-
adoption visitation. Although post-adoption visitation agreements can be
court enforced in Indiana, if court decides that post-adoption contact is not in
the best interest of the child, the agreement will not be enforced.22 Although
the term "agreement" implies that Iris' and her relatives could agree on the
terms of the post-adoption contact, Indiana statute requires that CPS, and the
CASA or GAL, consent to the post-adoption visitation.229 However, once the
state and the CASA or GAL consents, the parties sign the agreement and the
state is no longer involved. We felt that once the state was removed, Iris and
her relatives would have a chance to arrange visitation between them.
As a lawyer there were two things that troubled me about watching
this unfold. The first was Iris' anger and disbelief. Iris told me, "I've
learned that you should just never ask for help." She feels that the loss of
her child is partly her fault: had she never called Child Protective Services,
228. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-2(1) (Michie 2000) (provides that "[a] court may grant post-adoption
privileges if: the court determines that the best interests of the child would be served by granting post-
adoption contact privileges .... ").
229. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-2(5) (Michie 2000) ("the licensed child placing agency sponsoring
the adoption and the child's court appointed special advocate or guardian ad litem appointed under IC 31-32-3
recommends to the court the post adoption contact agreement .... ).
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perhaps this would never have happened. But then again, it was important
for Iris to "do the right thing" as we reminded her when she signed the vol-
untary termination papers. However, the only option for poor people should
not be to call Child Protective Services in order to afford help for their chil-
dren. A wealthy family would have never needed to call on the state for
help; they would have taken care of the counseling privately. The world is a
different place for poorer people, and Iris brought that point home to me.
Secondly, my experience with Iris made me aware of the lack of
choices we as lawyers sometimes have to offer. There should be options for
clients to weigh risks. Yet the termination hearing, as I quickly learned, was
a formality. The judge does not do the fact-finding, the CASA or GAL does.
They really control the case. Whatever they say goes. It was amazing to me
how the rules of evidence went out the window at one of Iris' hearings. The
periodic six-month review should have been an opportunity to review her
placement at the therapeutic foster home. When Iris could not afford a sepa-
rate room for Mary Jane, the state should have helped her meet her case plan.
The periodic CHINS review is supposed to be the place to make these deci-
sions. Instead, the judge listens to the GAL.
To call this periodic review a hearing would be inaccurate. The
prosecutor was to the left of the bench, and we stood to the right. In the
middle, in front of the judge, were the GAL and the DCFS caseworker. Be-
hind them were the foster parents. Next to them were the child's psycho-
logical counselor and someone else I could not identify. The prosecutor
went first, stating that this was a periodic review of Mary Jane's placement
outside of her biological home. The prosecutor then asked a few questions
of the DCFS caseworker about the length of Mary Jane's placement and
whether or not she felt Mary Jane should stay with her uncle. The case-
worker did not take the stand, and did not take an oath. The caseworker was
there to represent the best interest of the child, but it soon became apparent
why the GAL, the foster parents, and the psychological counselor were also
present. After the caseworker was done, the judge asked the GAL if she had
anything to add. Then the judge made sure the back row of people, includ-
ing the foster family, had a chance to say something. None of these testimo-
nies was under oath. The prosecutor never called these witnesses to testify.
We could have cross-examined them, but nothing they said was really "evi-
dence." In addition, we wanted to maintain a relationship with the relatives
and the GAL who had to consent to post-adoption contact.
Perhaps worse than Iris' experience with the judicial system, was
that of another client, Fran. Fran also voluntarily terminated her rights to a
child- three children, in fact. Fran admitted herself to a mental hospital for
severe depression. While she was there, Child Protective Services petitioned
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the court to declare Fran's children as Child in Need of Services. Fran re-
ceived notice of this first CHINS hearing but she was in the hospital and
unable to attend. Although the parties should receive notice of each subse-
quent CHINS hearing, it is the practice in St. Joseph's County to send the
first notice by mail, but give subsequent notices of hearing dates orally.
That is, the next hearing date is scheduled at the previous hearing. In this
way, Fran never received notice of the subsequent CHINS hearings. Mean-
while, Fran was the subject of a state case plan, but did not know it. No
Child Protective Services worker ever talked to Fran about her case plan or
even made her aware of it. Finally three years later, the prosecutor sent Fran
a notice for a termination hearing. Terminations are separate from CHINS
actions, so the court sends out a written notice. It was then that Fran's coun-
selor from the mental hospital called the Legal Aid Clinic and asked us to
help.
Sadly, Fran consented to the termination of her rights to her three
children, when her oldest child, a twelve-year old girl, begged and pleaded to
be able to continue to see Fran. Fran very much loved her children but did
not think with her mental condition that she could take care of the three chil-
dren who were the subject of the CHINS action, as well as her newborn.
Fran's daughter was beside herself, and begged Fran to terminate her rights
to them so that we could draft a post-adoption visitation agreement. That
agreement allows Fran to see her children extensively in unsupervised visita-
tion, including the entire summer when they are out of school. Although we
might have been able to prevail at Fran's termination hearing, Fran knew the
closest she would get to a guarantee that she could see her children was a
voluntary termination with post-adoption contact. Just like in Iris' case, if
we lost the termination case, strangers could adopt her children and there
would be no post-adoption visitation.
After seeing this process, I concluded that the adversary system did
not function properly. In both Iris and Fran's cases, the state should have
helped the parents meet their case plans. Foster caregivers receive money
from the state but natural parents are not entitled to any assistance. In both
cases, the prosecutor was open to different placements for these children,
perhaps guardianships, but was forced to petition for termination under the
Adoption and Safe Families Act. Once this proceeding was set in motion,
there were not adequate safeguards of parental Due Process rights. In Fran's
case, the service of process system broke down, forcing her into of the fed-
eral act's fifteen-month termination time limit. In Iris's case, there were too
many people in front of the judge. The rules of evidence were not in place,
and all sorts of hearsay and irrelevant testimony came before the judge, who
was free to call his own witnesses. Furthermore, the objective fact-finder,
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the GAL, seemed biased again the mother. And CPS sabotaged her psycho-
logical evaluation. Yet, the judge did what the GAL recommended.
A STUDY OF TERMINATION CASES IN SAINT JOSEPH COUNTY, INDIANA OVER
THE LAST TEN YEARS
After seeing what Iris and Fran went through, I wondered if all ter-
mination cases played out similarly. Did others feel the same lack of options
as our clients did? Were the lack of state services and the presumption in
favor of termination after fifteen months problematic in all terminations?
Did the judge always follow the recommendations of the CASA or the GAL?
In order to answer these questions, I decided to study the impact of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act on terminations in the local probate court.230
I reviewed all the termination cases in Saint Joseph County, Indiana, over
the last ten years.23' I wanted to evaluate the effectiveness of the current law
based on facts and not political lobbies, or societal perceptions. Are we im-
plementing the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1998 with any greater
success than its predecessors? Until we have an informed answer to this
question, our law review articles, and congressional hearings are based only
on conjecture.
For each case, I gathered information on the following categories:
1. Was the case a voluntary or involuntary termination?
2. The child's birthday.
3. When was the child removed from the home?
4. When was the termination filed?
5. When was the termination decided?
6. How many times did the termination case come before the judge?
7. Were the biological parents at the hearing?
8. Did the judge consider physical abuse to the child?
9. Did the judge consider sexual abuse to the child?
10. Did the judge consider abuse to the mother or domestic violence
in the home?
11. Did the judge consider the mother's past?
12. Did the judge consider abuse to the father?
230 In order to begin reviewing termination cases in Indiana, I had to agree to abide by an Indiana law requiring
me sign a confidentiality agreement. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-39-2-11(4) (Michie 2000). Once this agree-
ment was signed, the probate court was required to grant my access to these records if I adequately detailed
my research and the safeguards I intended to use to preserve the confidentiality of the records.
231. See Appendix.
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13. Did the judge consider the father's past?
14. How long was the child cared for out-side of the home?
15. Did the judge consider any domestic violence in the foster home?
16. Was adoption planned for the child?
17. Did the child testify?
18. Did the judge consider the child's desired place to live?
19. Was there a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) or
Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) for the child?
20. Finally, did the judge consider anything else relevant in his deci-
sion to terminate parental rights?
I set up a spreadsheet to record this data in each case.232 However,
I noticed almost immediately that the termination records in Saint Joseph
County simply did not provide all of this information. Each case answered
Questions one through six well. It was rare that a termination case did not
list the child's birthday or indicate how many times the case had gone before
a judge. However, the rest of the record was sparse. Most records did indi-
cate if the court appointed a CASA or GAL. However, not all court ap-
pointed advocates wrote reports. But, if the file contained any additional
background information, it was always in the CASA or GAL report to the
court. Although I took notice of the facts in these reports to the court, the
record does not indicate if the judge considered them
While recording this data, I took notes on my general impressions of
the termination cases by year. I began by looking at the most recent cases
first. In 2000, the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act was in full force.233
I noticed that the files were thicker than previous years. I was hopeful that
this meant the file contained more information. However, I found that this
was because the form for petitioning to terminate parental rights used by the
Office of Family and Children Services was longer. In addition, if a CASA
or GAL was appointed to the case, they often wrote lengthy reports, unlike
earlier years. However, the judge's remarks were almost non-existent. In
each case I reviewed over ten years, the termination order was a form, filled
out by the judge. The reasons for the termination in the judge's opinion
were never given, unless the judge had to go back and make a record of facts
for an appeal. The forms for the years after the enactment of the 1997 Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act all stated:
Children removed for at least 6 months under a dispositional de-
232. See Appendix.
233. See See 501(a), Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 111 Stat. 2115, 2136 (1997).
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cree of this court dated __ , cause # . There is rea-
sonable probability that the conditions resulting in the removal of
the children from his parents' home will not be not be remedied.
There is reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent
child relationship will pose a threat to the well being of the Chil-
dren. It is in the best interest of the child(ren) that the parent-child
relationship be terminated. The St. Jo. Co. Office of Family and
Children has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the
children which is
This last blank was usually filled-in with the word "Adoption." In
fact, out of sixty-three terminations in 2000, thirty-four had adoption as the
clear post-termination goal. 3 I was only able to note that adoption was the
final goal if the blank in the termination order form was filled in. Often it
was not. This was true as far back as 1997, when the Adoption and Safe
Families Act became effective. It is my guess that this is when the court
started using these termination order forms. As with any form, it is easy to
forget to fill in certain blanks. Therefore, out of the thirty terminations in
2000 where adoption was not written in the file, it is impossible to tell how
many of these children might have been put up for adoption.
This same form was used for terminations in 1999 and 1998. In both
of those years, I found that the order forms were not always filled out, and
again adoption was listed as the permanency goal only about half of the
231time.  I also noticed that there were cases where a CASA or GAL had
clearly been appointed, because his report was in the file, but in the space in
the termination order where their name should be was blank. In fact, one file
was missing the order for termination (or the order for dismissal), making it
impossible for me to know the outcome of the case.
There were nearly half as many terminations in 1999 and 1998 as
there were in 2000: thirty-one and thirty-two respectively, compared to
sixty-three in 2000.236 In 1998 and 1999 I noticed the CASA or GAL reports
were shorter and there were less of them. This is when I first noticed that
siblings do not get separate termination orders or petitions. This was a
change from earlier years when each child got his own case number. How-
ever, each of the 303 data entries I recorded refers to a separate child. 37 If
two children were referred to in one case, I gave them two separate data en-
tries. Thus, far fewer than 300 sets of parents had their rights terminated
over the last ten years in Saint Joseph County.
234. See Appendix, Graph H.
235. See Id.
236. See Appendix, Graph A.
237. See Appendix, Table I.
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In 1997, there were fifty-four terminations in Saint Joseph County.238
Recall that this was the year that the current federal act became effective.239
I noticed right away that some of these files were smaller and I thought this
was because there were fewer CASA and GAL appointments in 1997 then
there were in later years. Yet, the data proves otherwise. 1997 marked the
year with the most CASA and GAL appointments, twenty-seven out of fifty-
four cases.240 In fact, 1997 is one of the years where CASAs and GALs were
appointed in 100 percent of the involuntary termination cases.24' I realized
that even though CASAs and GALs were appointed in all the involuntary
terminations in 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996 and 1997, they did not always write
242reports. Although not 100% of involuntary terminations had CASAs or
GALs in the years following 1997, most of all of those wrote reports, mak-
ing the files thicker. Where CASA or GAL reports did exist, the judge al-
ways went with their recommendation, just like in Iris' case. In fact, in only
three cases out of 300 in the past ten years did the judge dismiss a petition
for termination.243 In each of those cases, the CASA or GAL wrote in his
report that he or she felt this option was the best. Convincing the CASA or
GAL is convincing the probate judge.
Often the only indication that I had about the nature of the termina-
tion was the report by the CASA or GAL. Yet, grieving parents and family
members would frequently also write to the judge, begging him to reconsider
the termination proceeding. A friend of a father who was attempting to re-
gain custody of his child wrote that she had known the father to work hard
for the last six years to rebuild his life. In fact, he became a "minister" or at
least deeply involved with his faith. This friend writes: "I beg the Court to
please do not... take away [the Father's] parental rights.... I believe [the
Father] is capable of being a good father. He has financial hardships just as
many other people in this country have. He is uneducated, as are many other
parents. However, he strives to improve himself and his life each day. He
truly loves his child and wants the chance to prove his abilities as a parent."
In this case, termination was granted. I do not know if there was another
side to this story because the file did not contain a CASA report, and the
judge never made any findings of fact. There was not much in the file but
the standard order.
238. See Appendix, Graph A.
239. See Section 166(a)(1), Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, PL
104-93, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
240. See Appendix, Graph F.
241. See Appendix, Graph G. In 1992, 1993, 1995, and 1997, a judge appointed either a CASA or GAL in
every involuntary termination case.
242. Id.
243. See Appendix, Individual Records.
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In the termination cases from 1991 to 1996, the governing federal
law was the 1980 Adoption and Child Welfare Act.244 Correspondingly,
there were fewer terminations from 1991 to 1996 than from 1997 onward:
123 compared to 180.245 Even the custodian of termination records said:
"they didn't do as many of them back then." This is mirrored in the shorter
one-page orders issued by the judges. Again, it's a form the judge fills out,
usually fraught with typos and misspellings, giving no indication what hap-
pened in the case, often leaving blanks. To me this indicates a lack of care.
I saw no indication that these cases were a court priority. It did not appear
that the judge saw the parties in the case more than once. In fact, there was
only one involuntary termination in 1992, and one in 1993, in which the
judge saw the parties more than once.24 6 Not until 1998 are there significant
numbers of termination cases that come before the judge more than once:
about forty-two percent in 1998, twenty-three percent in 1999, and forty-four
percent in 2000.247 There were simply fewer terminations when the 1980
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, and/or the 1996 Welfare Re-
form Act, were in place: eighteen in 1996, thirty-one in 1995, twenty in
1994, thirteen in 1993, thirty-three in 1992 and only eight in 1991.248 Al-
though this shows an increase in terminations over the years, there is unex-
plained fluctuation. Some of the years under the 1980 Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act have more than thirty terminations, some less than
fifteen. By 1993, I saw a marked decrease in the number of CASA reports.
Although there were only three CASAs or GALs appointed that year, all
three were assigned to involuntary termination cases, and none of them filed
a report that became part of the court record.2 49 By 1991, there were no
CASAs or GALs appointed for any terminations. 250 However, there were no
involuntary terminations that year either.251
It is clear from Graph A that the trend is towards an increasing num-
ber of terminations.252 There were more than fifty additional terminations in
2000, then there were just ten years before.2 53 In 1997, the graph spikes up
with fifty-four terminations that year, more than double the year before and
at least twenty more than in the previous years.254 Whether this is due to the
244. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-272,94 Stat. 500 (1980).
245. See Appendix, Graph A.
246. See Appendix, Graph J.
247. Id.
248. See Appendix, Graph A.
249. See Appendix, Graphs F and G.
250. See Appendix, Graph F.
251. See Appendix, Graph B.





change in the federal law is difficult to say based only on this graph. How-
ever, Graph B shows that the number of involuntary terminations mirrors the
number of total terminations.255 That is to say, when the total number of
terminations increases so do the number of involuntary terminations. 6
Graph D echoes this statistic, showing that almost seventy-eight percent of
all terminations in 2000 were involuntary compared to none ten years ago.257
In 1997, the year the Adoption and Safe Families Act became effective,
nearly ninety-six percent of all terminations were involuntary.258 However,
Graph D is puzzling because the percentage of involuntary terminations fluc-
tuates significantly over the years. This is the same for the percentage of
voluntary terminations in Graph E, which is logically the reverse of Graph
D: peaks in the percentage of voluntary terminations correspond to reduc-
tions in the percentage of involuntary terminations.259 I am uncertain why
this cyclical pattern appears.
The number of voluntary terminations stays relatively constant over
the first five years of the study, hovering near eight and a half terminations
per year.260 I think the sharp rise in voluntary terminations in recent years is
due to the greater number of parents who voluntarily consent to having the
state terminate their parental rights. I think these types of "voluntary" ter-
minations are coerced. Once a child is removed from the parental home for
more than fifteen months, Indiana statute, in accordance with the 1997
Adoption and Safe Families Act, must move to terminate parental rights.261
Knowing that a termination petition is imminent, and feeling as if
they probably will not win, parents may give up their children for adoption.
In fact, voluntary termination gives the parent his only chance to work out a
post-adoption visitation agreement. If the termination proceeds involuntar-
ily, the parent risks never seeing the child again. Why should the parents
feel their chances at these termination hearings are so low? The fact is that
only three cases out of the 303 that I studied resulted in a denied petition for
termination. If statistically a parent's chance is less than one percent that the
court will dismiss an open termination case, word will get around. Parents,
desperate to see their children, panic when this is the reality. I believe this is
why the number of voluntary terminations spikes so drastically in 1999.
Although the Adoption and Safe Families Act was effective in 1997, it took
255. See Appendix, Graph B.
256. Id.
257. See Appendix, Graph D.
258. Id.
259. See Appendix, Graph E.
260. See Appendix, Graph C.
261. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-2-4.5(1)(B) (Michie 2000).
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until this time to see its drastic impact. Lawyers merely need to tell parents
that the chances of dismissing an involuntary termination are remote and the
clients should choose voluntary termination because it comes with the poten-
tial for future visitation.
The Indiana Court of Appeals declined to reach a question of coerced
voluntary termination in In Re The Visitation of A.R, a Minor Child.262 In
that case, the petitioner was the biological mother of a child adopted by rela-
tives after the voluntary termination of her parental rights. After the termi-
nation was complete, the mother sought visitation with her child. She had
not, however, complied with the statutory formalities of Ind. Code § 31-19-
16-2. The court held that this statute provided the exclusive means for post-
adoption contact and the mother's failure to comply with its requirements
barred her from seeking visitation as a third-party non-parent after the adop-
tion.263 The court writes in footnote 1:
we note that in her reply brief, [the mother] questions whether her
consent to the adoption was voluntary. The issue of voluntariness
is pertinent to the question of whether the adoption should be set
aside. No motion to set aside the adoption has been filed, and we
will consider neither the legal issue nor the factual issues pertinent
thereto.26
In fact, termination orders for cases in 1998, 1999, and 2000 have a
provision on the basic form certifying that "no competent evidence of proba-
tive value that fraud or duress was present when the written consent was
given or that either of the parents were incompetent. ' 26s
Regardless of how much effort judges may put into discovering co-
ercion at the termination hearing, the Indiana Supreme Court has set a low
threshold. In Ellis v. Catholic Charities, the court found that consent to
adoption was voluntary even when the eighteen year-old girl was under the
assumption that she would be allowed to visit her son post-adoption.266 In
that case, the mother, Ellis, signed a termination of her rights a day after she
was discharged from the hospital for complications from childbirth. Catho-
lic Charities then filed a petition for termination of Ellis' rights in order to
make the baby available for adoption. Ellis, who received notice of this
hearing, appeared and asked to withdraw her consent. Ellis claimed that she
only consented to the termination of her rights under the belief that she
262. 723 N.E.2d 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
263. Id. at 479.
264. Id. at 480.
265. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-9 (Michie 2000).
266. 681 N.E.2d 1145 (Ind. 1997).
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would be allowed to visit her son.267 Catholic Charities told Ellis, however,
that post-adoption visitation agreements may not be enforceable in Indiana,
and that there was no legal right to an open-adoption allowing for visita-
tion.268 There was enough evidence that the mother was aware that post-
adoption visitation may not occur: "all she clung to was a hope, not any no-
tion of legal rights. '269 Therefore, the Indiana Supreme Court held her con-
sent to the termination to be voluntary: "emotion, tensions, and pressure are
• . . insufficient to void a consent unless they rise to the level of overcoming
one's volition.,
270
Graphs F and G address Court Appointed Special Advocates and
Guardian Ad Litems. Graph F indicates that there has been a steady increase
in the number of cases with CASAs or GALs. In 1997, twenty-nine termina-
tion cases had a CASA or GAL appointed: one for every single involuntary
termination.27' Involuntary terminations, however, do not always result in
the appointment of a CASA or GAL. In 1994, 1998, 1999 and 2000, less
than all of involuntary termination cases had a CASA or GAL.272 I am not
sure why judges do not appoint CASAs or GALs in all termination cases. In
1992, 1993 and 1995, years before the enactment of the 1997 Adoption and
Safe Families Act, all of the involuntary terminations had either a CASA or
GAL. The appointment of a CASA or GAL does seem to be increasing
overall, as indicated by Graph F, but there is no explanation I can give for
why every involuntary termination case does not have a CASA or GAL.273
Perhaps this is statistical confirmation of judicial discretion in these ap-
pointments.
It is clear, however, that adoption is increasingly becoming a stated
option for children after termination. It is important to remember that many
case files simply do not state the post-adoption plan for the child. Cases
where adoption was noted, however, are on the rise. In fact, the pro-
termination policy advocated by the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act
seems to be working. In 1996, adoption was the post-termination plan for
the child in only seven cases.274 By 1997, the number of stated adoption
plans more than quadrupled. 275 After the implementation of the 1997 Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act, more than sixty-six children were to be put up
267. Id. at 1149.
268. Id. at 1150.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1151, (quoting Matter of Adoption of Hewitt, 396 N.E.2d 938, 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)).
271. See Appendix, Graphs F and G.
272. See Appendix, Graph G.
273. See Appendix, Graphs F and G.




for adoption in Saint Joseph County after their parents rights were termi-
nated. This is more than the entire pre-Adoption and Safe Families Act
years combined.276 Graph I is even more telling because it looks at the per-
centage of cases where adoption was the stated post-involuntary termination
goal.277 In 1997, the year the Adoption and Safe Families Act became effec-
tive, 100 percent of all involuntary terminations had adoption as the post-
termination goal.278 It is important to pause here and recall the other options
available to children, including long-term foster care, relative placements,
and guardianships. Yet, in none of the 1997 involuntary terminations were
these options pursued: a testimony to the effect of the federal legislation on
changing state policies. Although only forty percent of the cases in 1999
stated explicitly that adoption was the plan, the judge may have left blank
the space concerning future arrangements for the child.2 79 This is sad. The
termination hearing exists to consider the best possible placement for the
child, yet the judge often does not take a moment to indicate on the record
what was decided and why. In 1999, the Saint Joseph County Probate judges
saw the fewest number of terminations since the Adoption and Safe Families
Act was implemented.2 80 Even in 2000, when there were more terminations
than ever before, the judge could have taken the time to individualize his
termination orders. In 2000 there were sixty-three terminations, which aver-
ages to less than six a month. 28' The judge rarely sees termination cases
more than once.282 In fairness, I know that the judges see many CHINS, or
Children in Need of Services cases, and could be familiar with the facts be-
fore the case reaches the termination stage. Only about half of the termina-
tions in 2000, however, came before the judge more than once.2 83
I think this underscores the fact that the termination hearing is a for-
mality; the judge fills out a blank termination order form and proceeds to the
next case. Only in 1999 and 2000, do we begin to see voluntary termination
cases come before the judge multiple times. 28" This may indicate that not all
"voluntary" terminations are, in fact, free of coercion. A case in which a
parent gives their child up for adoption at birth does not come before the
judge more than once. Voluntary cases where the parents start by fighting
276. Id.
277. See Appendix, Graph I.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See Appendix, Graph A. I would have information that is much more accurate if at each of these
terminations the judge had taken the time to draft a specific order, tailored to the facts of the ease.
281. Id.





the termination and then consent may explain why the case comes before the
judge more than once, accounting for the presence of voluntary cases on
Graph j. 285
Graphs K, L, and M address the age of the child when the termina-
tion occurs.2 86 The mean age of the child at the time of the termination is on
the rise.287 The average age of a child at termination ten years ago was less
than one year old.288 In 2000, the average age was eight.289 Since the adop-
tion of the Adoption and Safe Families Act in 1997, the average age of a
child whose parents' rights are terminated, is on the rise.290 I think this is
mainly due to the federal mandate that after fifteen months away from the
mother, the state should move to terminate parental rights.29' In addition,
before the federal law pushed for adoption, the court terminated parental
rights to older children less frequently because guardianships or long term
foster care was seen as a possible option. In 1998, the first year in which the
Adoption and Safe Families Act was fully effective, Saint Joseph County
saw terminations of rights to children who were on average nine years old.292
The Adoption and Safe Families Act seeks to keep children from
growing too old in foster care, by placing them up for adoption at an early
age.293 The act has been successful at this because the mean age of children
at involuntary termination is rapidly declining.294 Notice if the mean age of
terminations for involuntary children is declining while the age of overall
children in terminations is on the rise, this indicates that the age of children
in voluntary terminations must be rising faster than the decline in children in
involuntary terminations. Graph M confirms that in some years the mean
age of a child in a voluntary termination can be as high as six.
295
Graph S indicates that the mean time between filing a voluntary ter-
mination and getting the final order is on the rise.296 In 2000, the time be-
tween filing and final order leapt from less than a year to almost two years.297
It was on the rise since 1998, the year the Adoption and Safe Families Act
became fully effective. This may again reflect the fact that not all "volun-
285. Id.
286. See Appendix, Graphs, K, L, and M.
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tary" terminations are in fact voluntary. Parents start out fighting for cus-
tody but then consent to termination, such as in Iris' or Fran's cases. 298 Fur-
ther, there are fewer "voluntary" terminations than involuntary ones. These
"voluntary" terminations can occur with older children, while the overall age
of terminations can be on the decline, since far more terminations are invol-
untary and they are now occurring at earlier ages.
In 1992, the average age for a child in an involuntary termination in
Saint Joseph County was nine years old.299 In 2000, the average age at in-
voluntary termination was about two years old.300 Now that children can
only spend fifteen months of the last twenty-two months in foster care before
a termination proceeding occurs, the mean age of a child in an involuntary
termination case is not much older than twenty-two months, or two years.301
Graph M, depicting children's mean ages at voluntary terminations
in the last ten years, is slightly harder to interpret.302 Most years the child is
less than a year old when the parents voluntarily consent to terminate their
rights.30 3 In 1994 and 1998, however, the average age of children in volun-
tary terminations was about six years old.30 4 I conjecture that these were two
years heavily impacted by federal reform. In 1996, Congress passed the
Welfare Reform Act, threatening imminent financial aid reductions to fami-
lies with dependent children.30 5 It is quite possible that poor parents felt they
would no longer be able to care for their children, and thus gave them up for
adoption. In 1998, the first full year of effectiveness for the Adoption and
Safe Families Act, lawyers were telling their clients how difficult it would
be to defeat the mandatory termination petition. Out of fear, parents who
wanted to retain custody of their children consented to voluntary termination
in the hopes of obtaining a post-adoption visitation agreement.
Graph N shows that children spend far less time in foster care under
the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act than they did prior to its enact-
ment.30 6 Before this change in federal law, children could spend on average
as much as five years in foster care in Saint Joseph County. 30 7 Now, children
are in foster care for no more than about two years.30 8 The Adoption and
298. See supra note 225.
299. See Appendix, Graph S.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See Appendix, Graph M.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105 (1996).





Safe Families Act has reduced the time children spend in foster care by re-
quiring a termination hearing after fifteen months away from a parent." 9
Except for 1999, which appears to be an outlier, the average age for children
in involuntary terminations is going down while the average age for children
in voluntary terminations has increased.31 This is again, most likely due to
the 1997 Adoption and Safe Family Act mandated termination proceedings.
In involuntary terminations, the mandatory termination proceedings keep the
average age of children low. The fear of loosing a child permanently to an
involuntary termination proceeding, however, is real, increasing the mean
age of children in voluntary placements.
Finally, I graphed data relating to time between the filing of termina-
tion petitions and their disposition.311 By 1997, parents waited nearly eight
and a half months before a termination decision was reached in their case. 312
After the implementation of the Adoption and Safe Families Act, the mean
time delay between filing and final order was down to around two and a half
months.313 I do not think this reflects a less crowded judicial docket. In-
stead, I think this shows that the termination proceeding is a formality. It
proceeds rather rapidly once it is initiated. As noted in Graph J, far more
termination cases come before the judge multiple times now than ever be-
fore. 314 The judicial docket is not so crowded that a judge cannot entertain
several hearings on a petition for termination. From 1991 to 1999, the aver-
age time between filing and hearing on a voluntary petition for termination
was about two and a half months.315 Recently, however, this has shot up to
over a year, indicating that voluntary terminations now are comprised not
solely of those who give their babies up at birth.3 16 Voluntary terminations
now include those who struggle with the decision after having parented their
child for some time. Parents now realize that the 1997 Adoption and Safe
Families Act facilitates petitions for termination. An experienced lawyer can
tell a client that they have little chance of defeating such a petition once a
termination case has started.
309. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2118 (1997).
310. See Appendix, Graphs 0 and P.
311. See Appendix, Graphs Q, R, and S.
312. See Appendix, Graph Q.
313. Id.
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As the statistics indicate, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1998 has resulted in an increased number of total terminations, the majority
of which are involuntary.31 7 In 1997, the year the Adoption and Safe Fami-
lies Act became effective, nearly ninety-six percent of all terminations in St.
Joseph's County were involuntary.318 The majority of the information I re-
ceived about the nature of the termination case came from the CASA or
GAL report in the file. These court-appointed advocates have enormous
influence on the judge. This is because the judicial hearings in these cases
are informal, and those without standing in the case, such as the CASAs and
GALs, are allowed to speak freely. The rules of evidence do not govern
their testimony. This is only part of the problem. Prosecutors in these cases
are forced by the current federal law to seek termination after a child is in
foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months.319 The Adoption and
Safe Families Act now presumes that termination is in the child's best inter-
est.32 ° The state is responsible now for both filing the termination and rebut-
ting this presumption when they feel termination is not in the child's best
interest. This has serious due process implications because it saddles the
state prosecutor with dual roles: petitioning for the termination of parental
rights after fifteen months as well as dismissing that petition when it is not
necessary. Ideally, the Act should be changed to reverse this presumption.
The state should have just one role to play. Further, case plans for families
should include reasonable goals and parents should be given state services to
meet these goals. The termination hearing should not be held until it is
shown that the state services were provided to the family with sufficient time
for them to make an impact. Finally, in seeking to give children permanent
placements in adoptive homes, the Adoption and Safe Families Act ignores
other possible solutions. Each child should be treated separately, and all
options for that child should be explored.
THE CASA/GAL PROBLEM
Graph F indicates that the use of CASAs and GALs in cases is on the
rise. In almost all involuntary terminations since the inception of the Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act, a CASA or GAL has been involved.32' In fact,
317. See Appendix, Graphs A and B.
318. Id.
319. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2130 (1997).
320. Id. at 2116.
321. See Appendix, Graph G.
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the only background information I received when reviewing the termination
cases in Saint Joseph County came from the reports written by the CASA or
the GAL. Not all of the CASAs or GALs investigated the same way, inter-
viewed the same witnesses, or wrote the same kinds of reports. Their opin-
ions were just that, their own personal opinions. Because these opinions are
usually determinative of the outcome of the case, they are important factors
in parental rights terminations. When a CASA or GAL decides that termina-
tion would be the best option for the child, the judge is usually persuaded. If
the personal opinions of CASAs and GALs are going to have this much in-
fluence, then they should be based on uniform factors. These court ap-
pointed advocates should have specialized training in child psychology or at
least a degree in social work. The National Association for Court Appointed
Special Advocates does not hide the fact that CASAs can come from all dif-
ferent backgrounds:
People who give their time to CASA come from many different
places. Some have years of education and professional experience
working for children and families. Some have themselves grown
up in the foster care system and felt the sorrow of having to move
from home to home, others may have flourished in a warm and lov-
ing family, never once imagining that there were children who did-
n't have caring parents.322
This is precisely the problem. The diverse backgrounds of the CASAs are
not tempered with enough uniform training. Although the national program
for CASAs advocates a forty-hour training course, the materials are adopted
differently in every local community.3 3 As a CASA volunteer has so aptly
put it: "The lawyers know the statutes, the social workers the regulations.
But the CASA volunteer is assigned to know the child. 3 24 The problem is
that how a CASA or GAL gets to know a child, and reports on that child's
life is different with each CASA or GAL. Whatever training these CASAs
or GALs receive, their personal prejudices are often still present.
For example, in one case a CASA remarked on a child's "quick and
painless adaptation to the change in foster homes. I do not think I would
adapt as fast and as well if I took my family and moved to the next block, let
alone left my family behind." In the next paragraph, however, the same
CASA says that the child cannot bond well, saying that he lacks this ability.
322. See http://www.nationalcasa.org/casa/confer.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2002).
323. See http://www.nationalcasa.org/volunteer/index.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2002).
324. See http://www.nationalcasa.org/volunteer/anna-quindlen.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2002) (quoting
from Quindlen, Foreword, LIGHTING THE WAY: VOLUNTEER CHILD ADVOCATES SPEAK OUT (National Court
Appointed Special Advocate Organization ed., 2001)).
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How can this be when the CASA just wrote that the child was adapting quick
and painlessly? This CASA concluded her report by highlighting the fact
that there was no available funding to find someone to do a competent
psychological review of the child. She could not find a local therapist
skilled in diagnosing and treating children with attachment problems. I think
she got one thing right: a skilled psychologist needs to make an attachment
disorder diagnosis. Nevertheless, the state has funded the CASA, and the
judge listens to these unprofessional opinions.
In another alarming example of CASA incompetence, a CASA
makes a personal judgment about a mother's alcoholism and psychiatric
treatment. In a 1997 case, a mother who had been sexually abused started
drinking. Her child was removed from her care by CPS. The CASA wrote
that the women complied with the case plan, was making "excellent pro-
gress," and attended all the requisite alcoholism meetings. "If she continues
there is every reason to think she'd be a good mother and a good person."
The CASA, however, still recommended termination because "the stress of
being a mom could drive her to drink again," even though the CASA specifi-
cally acknowledged that the mother was capable of identifying the signs of
any relapse and coping with them. The CASA understood how anxious the
mother was to be a good parent.
In yet another example, a CASA chastises a mother for not contact-
ing her son by letter. The CASA says "the excuses were lame. [Mother]
stated that she was afraid and that she couldn't find the right words." The
CASA went on to write that because the mother offered to tape record a
message to her son instead of writing, she was not making enough of an ef-
fort. I wondered right away if the mother could, read and write. Even if she
could, wouldn't a tape-recorded message be so much more personal? More-
over, isn't the mother trying to communicate? Furthermore, I was shocked
to discover that the reason for the termination was the mother had an unliv-
able home. The state of the mother's house is completely unrelated to her
ability to write a letter. Yet, the CASA recommended termination and it was
so.
Frequently CASAs would write about children as being "adoptable"
as if they were marketing a doll. One CASA remarked that the children "are
both delightful and very adoptable children." In another case, a CASA wrote
that "although [she] is a special needs child, she is very sweet, loving and
very adoptable." What is an adoptable child?
Finally, on the rare occasion that a CASA decided termination was
not in the child's best interest, the language in the CASA or GAL report
would read, for example, "it would be devastating to lose the connection
with the only person who has a significant relationship with her." Why is it
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not always devastating to lose contact with someone with whom you have a
significant relationship?
In a poignant letter, a grandmother, whose daughter was about to
lose custody of her two children, writes wrote that her daughter was sick,
lost her job, and had to move to the homeless center. The kids went to foster
care. The grandmother wondered why her daughter could not keep the kids.
She questioned the judge, "the case worker tells the foster parents they are
going to terminate [my daughter's] parental rights and give them [sic] adop-
tion. I thought the final decision was yours and not theirs?"
That letter was written in an involuntary termination case in 1997.
Recall that the 1997 Adoptions and Safe Families Act shifted the burden of
proof in termination cases.32 The state must file a termination petition after
a child has been out of the home for at least fifteen months.326 Although the
state can also move the have the petition they just filed dismissed, they must
provide a compelling reason as to why the termination is not presumptively
in the child's best interest.32 If the state simply files the termination peti-
tion, doing no other work, the presumption favors termination and it will
occur. To stop these routine terminations, the state must do more work by
finding facts that support reunification. The state has two roles: it must
carry out the federal mandate for a termination hearing after fifteen months
in foster care, and it must police its own decision to remove the child from
the home, finding facts to support reunification. Before this 1997 change in
federal law, the presumption was that termination was not in the child's best
interest and it forced the state to list reasons to the contrary.
Forcing a CASA or GAL into these dual roles requires that he or she
is impartial. Nevertheless, I have yet to find a report from a CASA that only
found facts, without taking sides or giving an opinion. In a 1997 case, the
Indiana Appellate Court reviewed an involuntary termination. They held
that the CASA was not a fair fact finder.328 The parents petitioned for GALs
for their children because they felt the CASA could "no longer objectively
report to the Court [on the children's best interests] .... It is in the best
interest of the children to have an independent reporter to the Court at this
time who is not an interested party in this cause of action." The parents'
request was denied by the Saint Joseph County probate court.
The appellate court acknowledged that the CASA in this case exer-
cised her right pursuant to I.C. § 31-35-2-4 which allows a CASA, GAL,
325. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115,2116 (1997).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. See Lodholtz v. St. Joseph County Office of Family and Children and the Saint Joseph County CASA,
715 N.E.2d 23 (Table, Ind. App. 1999) (unpublished).
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attorney for OFC,32 9 or prosecutor, to initiate the termination of parental
rights. However, the appellate court found that the CASA must always pro-
tect the best interest of child regardless of whether they filed the petition.
The appellate court cited I.C § 31-32-3-6 stating that "the legislature obvi-
ously contemplated that a CASA may become an adversarial party toward
the parents of a child he or she represents." However in this specific case,
failing to re-appoint a CASA (or as the parents wanted, a GAL) for proceed-
ings in the trial court for the actual termination hearing was not reversible
error, "especially where the evidence of record indicates that the best interest
of the children were adequately represented."
The parents, however, contended that substantial justice was hin-
dered because "the CASA's recommendations for termination may have
been influenced by false and misleading information provided by ... an OFC
caseworker who openly expressed hostility and contempt toward [the bio-
logical mother]." The Appellate court held that:
Without objective and truthful information concerning Parents and
the children, it is questionable whether the CASA, whose petition for termi-
nation of parental rights was based in part upon the information provided by
[the OFC caseworker], adequately represented and protected the best inter-
ests of the children. Considering the totality of the circumstances in the in-
stant case, we cannot conclude that the trial court's error was harmless.33
The CASA said that one of the biological twins born to the mother
died because the mother was addicted to drugs during her pregnancy. The
CASA got this misinformation from the OFC caseworker and did not inves-
tigate it herself. She just looked at the file. However, there was no positive
drug screen for the baby at birth, making CASA's reliance on OFC un-
founded. The child in question was one of two twins who died due to a non-
drug-related complication. A doctor had told the OFC caseworker that no
form of pre-natal care would have helped the child. The caseworker then
told the foster care agency that the mother had "killed the twin.., and [the
mother] didn't deserve to see any of her children, much less the new baby."
Further, the OFC caseworker said that when all visitations at the fos-
ter care agency were cancelled because it was Election Day, the mother did
not deserve "extra" visitation time. In short, it was documented that the
caseworker thought the mom was, as the appellate court found, "a loser, a
drunk, a drug user, and that she would see to it that her children were
adopted out."
329. The Office of Family and Children is a sub-section of the Department of Children and Family Ser-
vices (DCFS).
330. See Lodholtz at 9.
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The Indiana Appellate court thankfully noticed this despicable be-
havior. The court concluded that:
We cannot say that, based upon the apparent hostility of [OFC]
worker toward [the mother], [the CASA] possessed the information
necessary with which to represent and protect the best interest of
the children in the termination of parental rights proceedings at is-
sue. While we do not hold that the trial court was required to ap-
point a GAL as requested by the Parents, as opposed to appointing
a new CASA or re-appointing the same CASA, we find that the
trial court's intentional refusal to follow IC § 31-35-2-7 prejudiced
the children's right to adequate representation during the termina-
tion proceedings.3 3'
However in footnote 11, the appellate court continued:
We note that, at the hearing.., counsel for OFC requested a formal
re-appointment of CASA. The trial court refused, insisting that
CASA was already a party to the action. The trial court's disre-
gard for the statutory requirements compounds its mistake and fur-
ther supports our conclusion that the children's substantial rights
were prejudiced. We further note that, at that this same hearing,
the trial court declared that, "[I]f the parties want the GAL, the
parties are going to have to pay for it." Supp. Record. at 13. IC
§31-32-3-19 provides that any fees which arise from the appoint-
ment of a CASA or GAL will be paid for as provided in IC § 31-
40. IC §31-40-1-2-(a)(1), in turn, states that the trial court "shall
pay" costs incurred for "any services ordered by the juvenile court
for any child or the child's parent, guardian, or custodian." Thus,
the trial court improperly informed Parents that they would have to
pay for a GAL. Moreover, subjecting a CASA or GAL's compen-
sation to the whims of the very parents who may be antagonistic
toward the representative potentially undermines that representa-
tive's loyalties to the children whom he or she is duty-bound to
protect.
332
Although this scathing chastisement of the local probate judiciary
was appropriate, I think the appellate court could have gone one step further
by stating that the caseworker's prejudice stems in part from her lack of
training. CASAs, caseworkers, and GALs act here like fact-finding juries.
Although real juries are often not juries of one's peers, it bears noticing that
CASAs, GALs and caseworkers are not peers to the parents whose cases
331. Id. See also IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-2-7 (Michie 2000) (appointment of guardian ad litem or court
appointed special advocate).
332. Id. at 10,n. 11.
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they review. These people may or may not be parents, and are certainly bet-
ter off financially. Whether or not these differences motivated the OFC
caseworker's disdain for the parents in this case may never be known.
It is essential that the CASA, GAL, or caseworker have training.
They are the ones responsible for monitoring the parent's compliance with
the case plan. Training could create a uniform system to check compliance.
CASAs, GALs, and caseworkers can not be allowed to judge others. This
should be the judge's job. If Indiana is going to continue to use CASAs,
GALs, and caseworkers, they must understand the vast power they give these
individuals. As an example, one mother incarcerated for minor drug of-
fenses lost her child because the CASA had a "gut feeling" that the mother
was not going to be a good parent. The mother was outraged because she
felt betrayed by the "system" as she called it. She wrote a letter to the pro-
bate judge stating that although she had used drugs and realized her children
suffered because of her abuse, she was never given any state services. She
said she waited for two years for a "homemaker" from the state to come and
help her organize her home once a week. That person never came. All along
she felt as if the caseworker was on her side, telling her what she needed to
do to get her children back. Then one day, the caseworker visited her in jail
and told her that she was asking the state to terminate parental rights. In
disbelief the mother writes:
I have only missed one visit that was ever set up for visiting before
me being incarcerated. I would be doing as much as possible in a
case plan when ... the caseworker would decide to extend the plan
after I had truly finished it. She would say, 'it is my gut feeling
that you are not ready.' Therefore the plan would continue and
prolong the return of my children.
Ultimately, this mother's parental rights were terminated, despite the
lack of state services and the fact that she did all her case plan requested of
her. This illustrates just how much power a CASA, caseworker or a GAL
has over a parent. It is really the court appointed advocate, and not the
judge, who decides if a parent can get back together with her child. Parents
are correct when they complain that they can do everything to comply with
the case plan and are still denied reunification, as in Iris' case. Alternatively,
they comply with one case plan and the CASA or caseworker lengthens the
plan. The Indiana Appellate court has acknowledged that "while the [pro-
bate] court must assess the parents' ability to care for the children at the time
of the termination hearing, a component of that determination includes an
evaluation of the parents' patterns of conduct to determine the probability of
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future neglect and deprivation. 33 3 If only the judiciary performed this func-
tion with procedural safeguards. If we are going to continue to allow case-
workers, CASAs and GALs to determine a parent's future pattern of conduct,
it is imperative that we train them how best to do this. Especially when
CASAs, GALs and caseworkers are being certified as experts on child devel-
opment, as in one appellate case I reviewed. The mother, who was hearing
impaired was deemed unable to care for her child. The probate court quali-
fied the CASA as an expert on how the mother would handle her son during
periods of stress. The appellate court writes that:
"to qualify as an expert, the subject matter must be related to some
scientific field beyond the knowledge of the average lay person
and the witness must have sufficient skill, knowledge or experi-
ence within the field to make it appear that the witness's opinion or
inference will aid the fact-finder."
334
The appellate court thought the CASA was a qualified expert because
she had a degree in social work from Goshen College and had experience as
the mom's caseworker and caseworker for others. I think this ruling was
wrong. CASAs, GALs, and caseworkers are experts in nothing other than
societal norms. They have no psychological training to predict future behav-
ior accurately. Court appointed advocates for children need to be trained
properly and uniformly. Although the national program for CASAs provides
certain training, there is no guarantee that training will be uniform.335
The lack of training is only half of the problem. The CASAs and
GALs need to be treated not as other parties in the case, but as witnesses
called by the state prosecutor. In this way, their testimony can be subject to
a cross-examination by counsel for the natural parents. The CASA's or
GAL's lack of training can then be highlighted. The judge will then be
aware of the amount of time the CASA or GAL spent with the child, and the
people he or she interviewed. Most importantly, the cross-examination will
flush out any prejudice or animosity the CASA or GAL may have. Only
with a thorough cross-examination following the rules of evidence, can the
natural parent insure that the opinions of the CASA or GAL are examined.
If the CASAs and GALs are treated as witnesses, the judge will be-
come the impartial fact finder. Gone will be what happened in Iris' case,
where no less than six different groups of people were present before the
bench: the mother's representatives, the prosecutor, the GAL, the DCFS
caseworker, the foster parents, and the child's psychologist. The only people
333. In re Wardship of R.B. 615 N.E.2d 494,497-98 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
334. See Lodholtz at 9, citing Corbin v. State, 563 N.E.2d. 86, 92-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
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who were actually parties to the termination case were the mother and the
prosecutor. The other four groups of people should be witnesses for the
state.
When multiple people are heard, without the safeguards provided by
the rules of evidence, it is not surprising that the judge implements the rec-
ommendations of the CASA or GAL because the judge relies on them as
impartial fact finders instead of witnesses. The United States Supreme Court
recognized this problem in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, when it
noticed that "the State, the natural parents, and the foster parents, all of
whom share some portion of the responsibility for guardianship of the child.
• . all contend that the position they advocate is most in accord with the
rights and interests of the children. ''336 The judge needs to make the impar-
tial differentiation envisioned by the Supreme Court, instead of relying
solely on the CASA, GAL or caseworker, who is not professionally trained,
and who may be misinformed. The judge needs to re-assume his role as fact
finder by putting more time into termination hearings, and requiring that
opposing sides present full cases, and comply with the rules of evidence.
The judge can only be the true fact-finder, however, when the CASAs and
GALs are treated as witnesses subject to cross-examination.
DUE PROCESS CONCERNS
The extreme influence held by the CASA or GAL is a result of the
state's reliance on their opinions. The state prosecutor does not have the
time or resources to conduct his own investigations in each case. The state
is busy trying to comply with the statutory requirements of the Adoption and
Safe Families Act. As previously noted, the Act gives the state two roles;,
initiating termination and providing services to families. The state is re-
quired to initiate the termination of parental rights if the child has been in
foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months. 337 However, the state is
also required to make "reasonable efforts" to re-unite the family before the
termination occurs. These roles often conflict. The state has to initiate ter-
mination after a certain time, but it is also saddled with the task of opposing
such a termination if they feel it is not in the child's best interest.338 Before
the Adoption and Safe Families Act, the law presumed that termination was
not in the child's best interest, forcing the state to list the reasons why it be-
lieved otherwise. Now, the Act makes the opposite presumption and the
335. See http://www.natianalcasa.org/volunteer/index.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2002).
336. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 841-42.
337. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103, 111 Stat. 2115, 2118.
338. See H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 12 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739,2744..
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state has to move for the requisite termination hearing and then provide evi-
dence why it believes termination is not in the child's best interest. This
shifting presumption has due process implications because the party seeking
the termination must also be the party to oppose it.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the interests of parents in-
volved in the termination of their parental rights as being of primary consti-
tutional importance.339 The Court in ML.B. went further to state that "paren-
tal status termination is irretrievably destructive of the most fundamental
family relationship."340
Parents' fundamental rights therefore deserve procedural safeguards.
"The Indiana Court of Appeals, discussing the parental rights' termination
provisions at issue, has recognized that "the parent-child relationship is an
important liberty interest in which the state cannot interfere without provid-
ing the parents fundamentally fair procedures. 34' The question then be-
comes, whether or not the procedures used in state termination cases are fair
considering the dual role that state prosecutors have; to provide "reasonable
efforts" while also seeking termination.
In Phelps v. Sybinsky, the Indiana Court of Appeals acknowledged
the conflicting role played by the state.342 In that case, an autistic child was
removed from the parents' home because he needed more care then they
could give him.3 43 The permanency plan for the child was long-term medical
care outside of the home with regular visits by the parents.344 This plan con-
tinued for five years until the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act went
into effect.345 The state was then forced to ask for the termination of the par-
ents' rights because the child had been out of their care for at least fifteen of
the last twenty-two months. 346 The state prosecutor, however, told the family
that the state would also file a motion to dismiss the termination because it
was not in the child's best interest.347 The Phelps family then brought a class
action suit on several constitutional grounds. 348 The Indiana Court of Ap-
peals dismissed the class action in a summary judgment motion for failure to
339. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (stating that the "essential" and "basic civil" consti-
tutional rights of man are "far more precious ... than property rights" and "undeniably warrant[s] deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection").
340. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519. U.S. 102, 104 (1996).
341. InRe M.S., 551 N.E.2d 881, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
342. Phelps v. Sybinsky, 736 N.E.2d 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).





348. Phelps, 736 N.E.2d at 812.
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state a claim upon which relief could be granted.349 The court stated that the
requirement that the state prosecutor file a termination after a child has spent
more than fifteen months out of the home does not violate the parents' due
process rights.350 The court noted that the state had a legitimate interest in
bringing the parents before the judge on the termination petition, even if the
state intended to file a motion to dismiss. 5
The court held that although the prosecutor must file a termination
after fifteen months, but may also ask for its dismissal, he or she is not vio-
lating any ethical rules of conduct.3 52 The court found that the state prosecu-
tor must submit a termination petition even if they intended to dismiss that
petition; the filing is not frivolous because it allows judicial determination of
the best interests of the child.353
Although the process of bringing a petition only to dismiss it, may
not in this case be unethical, it is definitely gives the prosecutor two roles to
play. The court did not address this due process concern in Phelps. How-
ever, in Jeanie B. v. McCallum,354 the federal court in the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, recently acknowledged that children in termination proceedings
have three distinct rights under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,
which are enforceable under federal civil rights laws:
(1) the right to have the defendants initiate a proceeding to termi-
nate parental rights when a child has been in foster care custody for
fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months; (2) the right to have
the defendants, at the same time, begin to identify, recruit, process
and approve a qualified family for adoption; and (3) the right to
have the defendants document any exceptions that apply under 42
U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii). 355
This determination was part of a larger class action lawsuit brought against
the foster care system in Milwaukee.356 The case merely determined that the
plaintiffs were allowed to amend their complaint to include the violation of
their civil rights based on the three federal rights the court found to exist
under Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997.35' However, this case ac-
knowledges a child's fundamental right to have the state both initiate termi-
349. Id. at 813.
350. Id. at 818.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 817.
353. Id.
355. Jeanie B. v. McCallum, 2001 E.D. Wisc. LEXIS at *17.
355. Id.




nation proceedings and document any reasons not to proceed with termina-
tion. If a child is able to demand both of these rights simultaneously, then it
must follow that the state is required to both initiate termination proceedings
and dismiss them where appropriate.
However, I still do not believe that the state prosecutor should be
playing both of these roles. I think this confuses the adversarial system,
which relies on each party to have a stated goal. Before the Adoption and
Safe Families Act, the prosecutor had the discretion to file for termination
where he or she saw fit. The party opposing the termination provided the
evidence that termination was not in the child's best interest. Now, the
prosecutor is required to file the termination petition even when he or she
does not feel that it is in the child's best interest to do so. According to
Jeanie B., the prosecutor must secure two fundamental rights to all children,
namely that termination is filed after fifteen months and that it is opposed by
the state when not appropriate. The Adoption and Safe Families Act essen-
tially removes prosecutorial discretion. In so doing, it usurps the adversarial
system by requiring the prosecutor to be on both sides of the issue.
THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE SERVICES
In many of the cases I reviewed, there was no stated post-termination
plan for the child. However, there is an increase in the number of cases
where adoption is the post-termination goal. The pro-adoption policy advo-
cated by the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act seems to be working. In
1996, adoption was the post-termination plan for the child in only seven
cases.358 By 1997, the number of stated adoption plans more than quadru-
pled. 5
The emphasis of the current federal act is on post-termination place-
ments and not pre-termination services. However, an equal emphasis should
be placed on the services provided to natural parents before the termination
proceedings. Yet, the Indiana appellate court has ruled that failure by the
Office of Family and Children to provide the parents with a case plan did not
deprive them of their procedural due process rights in the termination pro-
ceedings, because proof of a case plan is not an element enunciated in the
termination proceedings under IC § 31-35-2-4.36 0
Indiana Code Section 35 of Title 31 deals exclusively with the termi-
nation of parental rights. 361 Specifically I.C. § 31-35-2-4.5 describes the
358. See Appendix, Graph H.
359. Id.
360. See Ferbert v. Marion County Office of Family Children, 743 N.E.2d 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
361. See IND. CODE APP. § 31-35 (Michie 2000).
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elements of a petition to terminate parental rights.36 2 According to this stat-
ute, the state must show that reasonable efforts at family reunification are
not required or that the child has lived in a foster placement for fifteen of the
last twenty-two months.363 As noted earlier, the CASA or GAL can file this
petition and the prosecutor can request to be joined as a party.3" However,
any party bringing the action is also required to file a petition to dismiss the
termination if the case plan has a documented; compelling reason that
termination is not in the child's best interest.365 The statute specifically
indicates that the state's failure to provide services according to the case
plan is a compelling reason to dismiss the termination petition."' It is
unfortunate that the Indiana Appellate court did not find a case plan to be a
necessary element of each termination. Complying with the case plan is the
best way that a parent can prove to the state that they want to reunite with
their child, and provide him or her with a good home.
The lack of services to a family is often the result of a caseworker
who feels that services would not be effective. Sometimes the state delays in
providing services until it is virtually too late. Remember the mother who
wrote to the judge from jail outraged that the state could take away her chil-
dren without providing adequate services. The mother remarked that the
caseworker "was supposed to have put me on a waiting list for a 'Home-
maker' in the 'system' to come out to my house once a week. I waited for
two years and I NEVER was visited by said person." Also, recall Fran, who
never knew she was the subject of a case plan until she had failed to comply
with it and termination proceedings began.
The lack of adequate state services has had a real impact on individ-
ual cases. The reason that the lack of state services affects termination cases
is that these parents can not afford the services on their own. It is only with
state support that most of the parents in termination cases are able to change
their lives. The children hurt most by the Adoption and Safe Families Act's
policies are those who are poor. Moreover, poor children come largely from
black families whose parents are not pictured as having strong emotional
bonds with their children.367 Black mothers "are stereotyped as deviant and
uncaring; they are blamed for transferring a degenerate lifestyle of welfare
dependency and crime to their children. Black fathers are simply thought to
362. See IND. CODE APP. § 31-35-2-4.5 (Michie 2000).
363. Id. at (1), (2).
364. Id. at (b)(2)(b).
365. Id. at (d)(1).
366. Id.
367. See id. at 131.
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be absent. 36 8 Society turns the other way when an adoption-centered child
welfare policy removes a disproportionate number of black children from
their homes because it confirms the stereotype that black mothers are not fit
anyway. However, society praises the system because it is less costly.
Iris' story helped me understand that poverty is at the root of almost
all the termination cases. Even the early studies in the 1950s found that
"abused children grew up in deprived, multi-problem families." '369 We need
to spend money on the poor instead of on taking their children away. Par-
ents like Iris who could get free counseling for their child without alerting
the Department of Family and Social Services would not be forced to con-
sent to the termination of the rights to their child. Furthermore, once the
state was involved, if they had spent money on a new bedroom for Mary
Jane instead of foster care, the termination would not have happened at all.
Early "social welfare advocates argued that only by attacking pov-
erty, unemployment, inadequate housing and health care, and the lack of day
care would solve the problem of child abuse and neglect."37 The money we
spend on foster families might be better spent on the biological family.37'
We have seen that foster families have enough resources to take a case to the
Supreme Court.372 Often the biggest difference between the foster family
and the biological family is money. If a biological parent does not have the
money to implement the goals of their case plan within fifteen months, they
risk losing their child. As mentioned above, one of the elements of Iris's
case plan was buying a bigger house. This was a goal higher than Iris could
reach on her salary.
I think we need to acknowledge that a lot of what is wrong with the
1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act is that it disadvantages poor people. It
does this through the CASAs, GALs, and caseworkers that bring societal
conceptions about poverty into the decision in every case. Buying a bigger
house for your children should not be a part of anyone's case plan because it
has nothing to do with effective parenting.
I believe our first step in educating CASAs, GALs, caseworkers and
judges must be instruction about what kinds of items should go into a case
plan. All parents could be better in some way, because no one is perfect. In
a situation where trauma, abuse, neglect, or severe poverty has brought a
368. See IND. CODE APP. § 31-35-2-4.5 at 131 (Michie 2000).
369. See supra, note 35.
370. See supra, note 83.
371. See supra, note 115 (The Federal Government matches state funds for children in foster care who
would also receive welfare, making money paid to the foster families exceed that paid to similarly situated
poor families.).
372. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 836 n. 40.
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child's living conditions to the attention of the state, we can not ask his par-
ent to change themselves in impossible ways. Case plan goals must be real-
istic and relevant. A case plan that calls for a poor, working family to buy a
new home is unrealistic without state assistance. It appears that many
CASAs, GALs and caseworkers think that a parent who has raised their child
in poverty, or married an abusive husband, done drugs or drank excessively,
or gotten into trouble with the law, to name a few, are simply unfit. Like the
incarcerated woman wrote to the probate judge: "To not give us, the children
and I a chance to be together goes against everything that the welfare system
has stated to me. It goes against everything I have worked for myself and
for my children." That mother acknowledges that she let her children down
in the past. The state must acknowledge that it has let her children down,
too. She writes that the services the state was to provide in her case plan
were virtually non-existent. The caseworker she trusted, the one that visited
her in jail and gave her pictures of her children, turned on her and terminated
her rights. At least, that is how she felt. She felt the state let her down, and
they did not admit it. We need to begin by admitting the ways in which this
new federal law, the Adoption and Safe Families Act, has let down so many
families. Then we need to repair this damage by providing all families, ;e-
gardless of income level, services they need to complete their case plans.
THE NEED FOR SOLUTIONS BEYOND TERMINATION
Dorothy Roberts, Professor of Law at Northwestern University and a
Faculty Fellow at its Institute for Policy Research, argues that the Adoption
and Safe Families Act heightens the already "conflicting incentives for child
welfare agencies that are likely to attenuate their efforts at family preserva-
tion. ,31 3 Roberts is not alone in seeing a conflict between these two goals.
"[T]he principle of permanence'contains exactly the dilemma that it sets out
to resolve, i.e., between family preservation and termination of parental
rights, 374 writes Libby Adler, Assistant Professor of Law at Northeastern
University. Adler correctly notes that "[t]he goal of the permanency hearing
is to hasten decision., 375 She suggests that lawmakers allow for a broader
range of outcomes to minimize this dilemma.3 76 Professor Roberts notes that
permanency and reunification compete for caseworkers time, and the Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act is meant to persuade the agency to focus on per-
373. Dorothy Roberts, Is There Justice in Children's Rights?: The Critique of the Federal Family Preser-
vation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112,114 (1999).
374. See Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe




manent placements for the child.377 Yet, Bruce Boyer, an attorney at North-
western University Law School in the Children and Family Justice Center,
feels that "furthering a family's interest will also benefit the children. 378 He
recognizes that "[c]hildren have an interest in maintaining a bond with their
parents and other family members and are terribly injured when this bond is
disrupted." '379 Roberts suggest that these two conflicting views on the rela-
tionship between children's interest and family preservation suggest that
there is no one correct way to understand children's rights. °
However you characterize children's needs, the Adoption and Safe
Families Act does not seem to be meeting them. Although children from
homes of severe abuse might be covered by the current provisions, "[m]ost
children in foster care were removed from their homes because of parental
neglect related to poverty. 381  The Act's emphasis on adoption attempts to
speed children through foster care, which does little to help poor children.
3 82
Roberts notes four problems with the system created under the Adoption and
Safe Families Act: there are insufficient adoptive homes, severing family
bonds usually hurts children, there is no way to monitor state removal pro-
grams, and no way to force states to do much family preservation.383 The
Act's emphasis on adoption as the cure to the foster system problem is mis-
placed because the number of terminations "far outpaces" the number of
adoptions, creating more foster children, especially those least likely to be
adopted, namely black children.384 Roberts acknowledges the Act's narrow
focus on adoption "overlooks both the diversity of parent-child relationships
as well as alternatives to adoption. 3 85 Some of the viable alternatives for
abused children include long-term foster care with parental visitation and
permanent placement with relatives who do not adopt them.
The Adoption and Safe Families Act fails most tragically in its un-
derlying assumption that the problem with foster care is that not enough
children are being adopted. The foster care problem occurs because too
many children are being removed from their families and put in the sys-
376. See id. at 12-13.
377. Roberts, supra note 374 at 114 ("In a case of conflict between reunification and permanency efforts,
permanency prevails.").
378. Id. at 117.115.
379. Id.
380. See id.
381. Id. at 118.
382. See id.
383. Roberts, supra note 374 at 118 ("In a case of conflict between reunification and permanency efforts,
permanency prevails.").
384. See id. at 120.
385. Id. at 121.
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tem. 6 Under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act's "reasonable
efforts" standard too many children were being removed from their homes
because caseworkers charged with both helping families and finding alterna-
tive placements often "sabotaged parents' quest to reunite with their chil-
dren., 387 A 1997 report by the General Accounting Office stressed that not
enough funds or staff existed to provide the services necessary to keep fami-
lies together. 388 "How can agencies expect to solve problems arising from
any combination of deplorable conditions-chronic poverty, dangerous
neighborhoods, shoddy housing, poor health, drug addiction, profound de-
pression, lack of childcare-with a three month parenting course or ephem-
eral crisis intervention?"'389
To compound the problem, there is no mechanism to police the
state's removal rates. A system like the one put in place by the Adoption
and Safe Families Act takes on a life of its own, and removes children al-
most mechanically without regard to their particular circumstances or their
best interest.39° It appears that the Adoption and Safe Families Act's under-
lying goal is financial gain for states: "Preserving children's ties to non-
custodial middle-class fathers helps to guarantee that these children will not
need public assistance. In contrast, terminating the rights of poor parents so
their children may be adopted by wealthier ones yields a financial windfall
for the state., 3
91
In the 1950s, the social awakening to the problem of child abuse was
a stimulus to finding its ultimate solution. When the problem was novel, all
answers generated some support. Over time, frustration with the problem
and the cost of supporting those affected by it weighed on the collective
mind. Congress demonstrated its desire to "fix" child abuse and went about
searching for solutions. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of
1973 addressed child abuse broadly.392 It advocated a "broad range of ser-
vices" to abused children and their families.393 It favored helping parents,
and only terminated parental rights if in-house services could not protect the
child.394 Most notably, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act cre-
ated the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect to conduct on-going
386. See id. at 125.
387. Id. at 124.
388. See id. at 124 (citing United States General Accounting Office Rep. No. HEHS-97-34, Child Welfare
- States' Progress in Implementing Family Preservation and Support Services 3 (1997)).
389. Id.
390. See id. at 127.
391. Id. at 130.
392. See Child Abuse and Prevention Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4, 5 (1974).
393. See id. at 6.
394. See H. R. REP. NO. 93-685, (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2763, 2768; see also PLECK,
supra note 14, at 178.
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research into the causes of child mistreatment. 395 Both the Adoption Assis-
tance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and the Welfare Reform Act of 1996
expanded our understanding of the causes of child abuse by authorizing ex-
tensive studies on the subject. 396 The current Adoption and Safe Families
Act has no similar research.397
Each of these acts also implemented a specific policy objective relat-
ing to the termination of parental rights. The Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980 recognized how many children were entering the foster
care system. 398 This became the new problem. Instead of focusing on how
children got into foster care, the act focused on how to find "permanent
placement" for children because foster care was both temporary and expen-
sive. 39 9 However, Congress did not abandon foster care prevention services
completely because it created the "reasonable efforts" to reunite families
requirement. °° It also allowed the "future status" of children to include a
wide range of placement options.4 °1
Congress responded to political and financial frustration from unnec-
essary intervention by enacting the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, or Welfare Reform Act.40 2 Simply
by its name, one can see its reactionary bias. With respect to termination of
parental rights, the Welfare Reform Act advocated preserving some family
bonds through relative placements even when the child could not be placed
with parents.4 3 Its biggest contribution to termination law was the study it
authorized to track abused children for several years. The report sought to
determine the causes of their abuse and subsequent removal from their home
and the effect the subsequent placements had on these children.4 4 While
these studies all reacted to the current problems, they still left their solutions
open-ended.
.Sadly, Congress abandoned its policy of seeking the best possible so-
lution when it enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997. This is
evidenced by the fact that Congress no longer wanted to study the causes of
395. See 88 Stat. at 4.
396. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2128 (1997).
397. See id. at 2116 (the only research authorized by this act are "Demonstration projects" undertaken in
the areas of drug abuse and kinship care).
398. See S. REP. No. 96-336, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 1448, 1461.
399. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500, 519
(1980).
400. See id.
401. See id. at511.
402. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105, 2105.




child abuse or potential solutions. Although the Act authorized several new
demonstration projects and a Kinship Care study,4"5 it did not address the
causes of child abuse or seek new solutions.4 6 Instead, the Adoption and
Safe Families Act decided that the best interest of the abused child was usu-
ally adoption. When history repeats itself, Congress will discover that adop-
tion is not the "ultimate solution," either. 7 There is no one solution to the
complex problem of child abuse. Adoption is attractive to Congress because
of its permanence and subsequently its cost effectiveness. Although Con-
gress assumes that children who are adopted are free of their problems, the
anxiety associated with losing a parent does not always make this the case.
Professor Adler has suggested that "[t]he principal of permanence
contains exactly the same dilemma that it sets out to resolve, i.e. between
family preservation and termination of parental rights."" 8 She also notes
that child welfare policy is infused with three larger contradictions: "family
privacy (or parental autonomy) versus child rescue; cultural relativism ver-
sus transcendent morality (or civic virtue); and social responsibility (for
poverty) versus personal responsibility., 409 The Child Welfare Act required
states to make "reasonable efforts" to keep families together, but the policy
shifted in the Reagan Era when the "poor were blamed for their own circum-
stances."4 0 This shift in attitude helped create the reversal of policy that
culminates in the Adoption and Safe Families Act.411 "Each development
reacted against the last, moving the ball endlessly between irreconcilable
poles., 412 The majority of people see the dichotomies as "a trap between two
things we value deeply but cannot have simultaneously., 413 Therefore, peo-
ple assume a decision must be made legislatively between these two di-
chotomies. However, this misses the point.
Adler argues that solutions cannot be obtained legislatively simply
by trying to find the right way to strike the balance between conflicting
views on the best interest of the child.414 Rather, we have to commit our-
selves, both politically and financially, to increasing the options available to
405. See 111 Stat. 2129.
406. See 111 Stat. at 2128 ("'Demonstration projects' shall be undertaken specifically in the areas of drug
abuse and kinship care").
407. See H. R. REP. No. 93-685, at 2766 (quoting Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Caspar W.
Weinberger on October 16, 1973 that "an ultimate solution" is needed to the child abuse and neglect problem
in the United States).
408. See Adler, supra note 2, at 1.





414. See Adler, supra note 2, at 30.
20021
Journal of Legislation
children by embracing the many concepts of family. 15 This has to start fore-
most with increasing the services available to families in need while we still
can. As the authors of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, wrote, "only
by attacking poverty, unemployment, inadequate housing and health care,
and the lack of day care, would one solve the problem of child abuse and
neglect." '416 We need to distance ourselves from the feeling that one solution
will work for all children. As the legislative history indicates, Congress has
searched for what is in the best interest of the child, assuming that there is
one child, and one set of circumstances creating his problems. No wonder
our legislation never fixes "the problem" of child abuse and neglect. This is
like assuming one pill is going to cure all medical ailments. Child abuse is
multi-faceted problem and demands openness, both judicially and fiscally, to
a wide range of placements for children, as well as a wide range of services
for their parents.
415. See id.
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Table II: Analysis of Data
Totals
Record #s # of Total # Voluntary % Voluntary # Involuntary % Involuntar
Total I to 304 303 94 0.31 209 0.69
2000 1 to 64 63 14 0.22 49 0.78
1999 5 to 95 31 21 0.68 10 0.32
1998 96 to 127 32 5 0.16 27 0.84
1997 128 to 181 54 2 0.04 52 0.96
1996 182 to 199 18 9 0.50 9 0.50
1995 200 to 230 31 11 0.35 20 0.65
1994 231 to 250 20 8 0.40 12 0.60
1993 251 to 263 13 9 0.69 4 0.31
1992 P64 to 296 33 7 0.21 26 0.79
1991 P97 to 304 8 8 1.00 0 0
Note: There is no record #14. It was entered as a non-termination case and so was deleted from
these statistics. Percent of Voluntary and Involuntary are out of the Total Voluntary and Involuntary,
respectively.
Mean Age at Termination
Voluntary Missing Involuntary Missing Total
Information Information
Voluntary Involuntary
Total 14 1 37.2 9 39.75
2000 522 0 783 0 2920.9
(1.43 years) (2.15 years) (8 years)
1999 54 0 1660 0 2177.6
(0.15 years) (4.55 years) (5.96 years)
1998 2186 0 38 0 3476.4
(5.99 years) (0.1 years) (9.52 years)
1997 57 0 1469 0 1642.1
(0.16 years) (4.02 years) (4.49 years)
1996 60 1 453 1 453
(0.16 years) (1.24 years) (1.24 years)
1995 45 0 2110 2 2110
(0.12 years) (5.78 years) (5.78 years)
1994 2095 0 1009 2 1009
(5.74 years) (2.76 years) (2.76 years)
1993 33 0 2814 0 638.38
(0.09 years) (7.71 years) (1.74 years)
1992 14 0 3260 4 14
(0.04 years) (8.93 years) (0.03 years)
1991 61.8 0 0 0 61.75
(0.17 years) 1(0.16 years)
Note: The records are in days. If a date in a record was uncertain, the day was calculated as the
1 5 th and the month as June. Missing Info = number of records reviewed where insufficient information
existed to calculate the mean age at termination.
[Vol. 28:2
Parental Rights
Mean Time out of Parent's Care
Voluntary Missing Involuntary Missing Total
Information Information
Voluntary Involuntary
Total 9.75 8 54.51 9 14.79
2000 1418 1 14039.1 0 810.5
(3.89 years) (38.46 years) (2.22 years)
1999 54 2 1449 0 54
(0.15 years) (3.96 years) (0.14 years)
1998 1175 0 38 0 744.8
(3.22 years) (0.10 years) (2.04 years)
1997 57 0 612 2 669
(0.16 years) (1.67 years) (1.83 years)
1996 60 1 717 2 777
(0.16 years) (1.96 years) (2.12 years)
1995 45 2 1433 3 1478
(0.12 years) (3.92 years) (4.04 years)
1994 58 2 725 2 725
(0.16 years) (1.98 years) (1.98 years)
1993 33 0 50 0 167
(0.09 years) (0.13 years) (0.46 years)
1992 598 0 836 0 567
(1.64 years) (2.29 years) (1.55 years)
1991 61.8 0 0 0 61.75
(0.17 years) I (0.17 years)
Note: The records are in days. If a date in a record was uncertain, the day was calculated as the
1 5 th and the month as June.
Missing Info = number of records reviewed where insufficient information existed to calculate the
mean age at termination.
This is the time between the removal date and the date the termination is final or between birth and
termination if child taken away at hospital.
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Mean Time Between Filing and Final Order
[Vol. 28:2
Voluntary Missing Involuntary Missing Total
Information Information
Voluntary Involuntary
Total 2.55 1 9.6 5 2.77
2000 647 0 2968 0 122
(1.77 years) (8.12 years) (0.33 years)
1999 38 0 14 0 60.5
(0.1 years) (0.04 years) (0.17 years)
1998 50 0 28 0 88
(0.14 years) (0.08 years) (0.24 years)
1997 40 0 187 0 244
(0.11 years) (0.51 years) (0.67 years)
1996 33 1 26 1 61.3
(0.09 years) (0.07 years) (0.17 years)
1995 35 0 123 2 158
(0.1 years) (0.34 years) (0.43 years)
1994 34 0 62 2 62
(0.09 years) (0.17 years) (0.17 ears)
1993 26 0 61 0 34.7
(0.07 years) (0.17 years) (0.1 years)
1992 0 0 41 0 153
(0.11 years) (0.42 years)
1991 27.8 0 0 0 27.8
(0.08 years) (0.08 years)
Note: The records are in days. If a date in a record was uncertain, the day was calculated as the
15 th and the month as June.
Missing Info = number of records reviewed where insufficient information existed to calculate the
mean age at termination.
Number of Cases with a CASA or GAL
Voluntary % of Missing Involuntary % of Missing Total
Voluntary nformation nvoluntary Information
Voluntary IraiVoluntary Involuntary
Total 11 0.10 19 96 0.9 59 107
2000 2 0.09 0 20 0.91 4 22
1999 5 0.417 8 7 0.98 1 12
1998 1 0.059 0 16 0.94 8 17
1997 0 0 0 29 1 19 29
1996 0 0 6 6 1 1 6
1995 0 0 1 3 1 4 3
1994 3 0.37 4 5 0.63 3 8
1993 0 0 0 3 1 0 3
1992 0 0 0 7 1 19 7
1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parental Rights
Number of Cases Where the Plan is Adoption
Voluntary % of Missing Involuntary % of Missing Total
Voluntary Information Involuntary Information
Voluntary Involuntary
Total 66 0.45 26 91 0.26 104 146
2000 11 0 0 28 0.28 2 34
1999 12 0.92 10 5 0.38 2 13
1998 5 0 0 14 0.74 11 19
1997 0 0 2 30 1 22 30
1996 1 0.14 8 6 0.86 2 7
1995 10 0.67 1 5 0.33 15 15
1994 3 0.75 5 1 0.25 11 4
1993 9 1 0 0 0 4 9
1992 7 1 0 2 0.29 35 7
1991 8 1 0 0 0 0 8
Number of Times Case Comes Before the Judge More Than Once
Voluntary Involuntary Total
Total 10 33 43
2000 6 15 21
1999 4 3 7
1998 0 8 8
1997 0 4 4
1996 0 1 1
1995 0 0 0
1994 0 0 0
1993 0 1 1
1992 0 1 1
1991 0 0 0
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Graph A: Total Number of Terminations
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Graph B: Number of Involuntary Terminations
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Graph C: Number of Voluntary Terminations
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Graph D: Percentage of Involuntary Terminations out of Total Terminations
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Parental Rights
Graph K: Mean Age of Child at Termination
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Graph L: Mean Age of Child at Involuntary Termination




Graph M: Mean Age of Child at Voluntary Termination
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Graph 0: Mean Time a Child is out of Parents' Care before Involuntary Termination
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Graph P: Mean Time a Child is out of Parents' Care before Voluntary Terminations




Graph Q: Mean Time Between Filing and Final Order in a Termination Case
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Graph R: Mean Time Between Filini and Final Order in an Involuntary Termination Case
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